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In emerging economies, political institutions (i.e., government and its agencies), act as a 
major force in defining and mobilizing resources. IT entrepreneurial firms endeavor to 
obtain resources from political institutions, named as political institutional resources 
(PIRs), to overcome insurmountable handicap of resource deficiency. However, how 
PIRs matter remains unclear. Acknowledging this gap, this thesis examines the influences 
of PIRs on IT entrepreneurial firms in emerging economies.  
 
The thesis firstly presents a thorough literature review, develops a new position of 
institution-based view (Chapter 2), and highlights the importance of PIRs in emerging 
economies (Chapter 3), followed by two separate but related studies. Study I (Chapter 4) 
is a theoretical paper that challenges the existing literature on the benefits of PIRs by 
unveiling the contingent effects of PIRs. Drawing on the institution-based view, Study I 
develops a theoretical typology of PIRs and explores the different effect of each type of 
PIRs on IT entrepreneurial firm performance. Specifically, based on three dimensions, 
PIRs are categorized into 16 sub-types with different effects on firm performance. This 
study opens the black box of PIRs, which lays down a theoretical foundation to sharpen 
our understanding of how public-private interaction (with a focus on the interplay 
between government and firms) affects technology innovation and commercialization, 
especially in the context of emerging economies. This study is exceptional and makes a 




Based on the theoretical framework of PIRs in Study I, Study II (Chapter 5) chooses to 
focus on one particular type of PIRs (regulative PIRs manifested in government subsidy), 
compares the distinct effects of two sub-types of it (i.e., directive subsidy vs. associative 
subsidy), and empirically tests their contingent effects on IT entrepreneurial firms’ IPO 
success. A novel data set was created based on public secondary data sources. Results 
from 106 IT entrepreneurial firms in China confirmed the hypotheses of Study II. 
Heckman selection model and IV estimation were employed to check the robustness. The 
findings of Study II reveal that directive subsidy has an inverted U-shape effect on a 
firm’s IPO success, while associative subsidy has a positive effect on IPO success. 
Moreover, these effects are moderated by two kinds of institutional ties, i.e., institutional 
bonding tie and institutional bridging tie. Through a contingency perspective, Study II 
unravels the paradox of government subsidy, thereby challenging past works that only 
hint at positive monotonic signaling effects to highlight potential negative and non-
monotonic ones. Moreover, the results of Study II demonstrate a section of the theoretical 
framework in Study I, and further reveal that more research efforts could be done to test 
other parts of the theoretical framework in Study I. 
 
This thesis makes valuable contributions. First, it contributes to the institution-based view 
by developing a typology of PIRs according to the characteristics of IT entrepreneurial 
firms in emerging economies. It opens the black box of PIRs which have predominately 
been regarded as a generic concept. This distinction is necessary especially when we 
demonstrate that some PIRs would enhance IT entrepreneurial firm performance in 
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emerging economies while others would impede firm performance. Second, this thesis 
contributes to the nascent literature on political capital in emerging economies by 
revealing the paradox of PIRs. Prior research mainly suggests that PIRs carry positive 
value, or that political changes or reforms may turn the positive value of PIRs into 
negative. The present thesis shows that even without significant political changes, PIRs in 
emerging economies could still become liabilities to IT entrepreneurial firms. Third, there 
is a lack of research that focuses on novel contexts (e.g., emerging-economy contexts) 
and develops innovative theories meaningful to these contexts. This thesis has developed 
a contextualized theory not only by raising novel questions in new contexts (i.e., the role 
of PIRs in emerging economies), but also by yielding an innovative theory that fits the 
new contexts and answers the emerging managerial and strategic questions. By 
addressing indigenous problems, it also informs and improves the strategy and 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
IT entrepreneurial firms, by discovering, evaluating, and exploiting opportunities of 
information technologies (IT) to create new goods and services (Shane 2000), are 
becoming increasingly important in supporting economic growth and development. It is 
well acknowledged that in developed economies, resources within firms and from 
external linkages with commercial parties are important indicators of the growth and 
performance of IT entrepreneurial firms (Barney 1991, Inkpen and Tsang 2005). Key 
internal resources include financial capital, human resources, organizational capabilities, 
and technological capabilities (Kaplan 2008, Park et al. 2002, Zahra and Nielsen 2002). 
Key resources from external linkages involve financial capital from venture capitals, 
information/knowledge or physical resources from alliance partners, and social status 
from alliance partner endorsement (Gulati and Higgins 2003, Soh et al. 2004, Stuart 
2000). 
 
However, in emerging economies, it is difficult for IT entrepreneurial firms to accrue 
these internal and external resources for survival and development (Mahmood and Rufin 
2005, Peng and Luo 2000). An emerging economy is defined as a country that 
experiences a rapid pace of economic development in transition to a more market-driven 
economy, such as China and India (Hoskisson et al. 2000). Different from developed 
economies, emerging economies do not have a stable free-market (Peng et al. 2008). The 
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lack of a well-defined property rights-based legal framework, together with the lack of 
political certainty (Peng and Zhou 2005), hinders resource mobilization among firms in 
emerging economies. High institutional uncertainty, high transaction costs, and imperfect 
market competition threaten entrepreneurial firms’ survival and growth (Park and Luo 
2001).  
 
Institutions, commonly known as the “rules of the game” (North 1990), should not be 
regarded as invisible background in emerging economies as in developed economies 
(Leung et al. 2005). Especially, political institutions, mainly referring to government and 
its agencies (Chan et al. 2008), act as a major force in defining and mobilizing resources 
in emerging economies. For example, the government in China controls significant 
portions of strategic factor resources and has considerable power to approve projects and 
allocate resources (Li and Zhang 2007), especially for IT industry (Ring et al. 2005). 
Similarly, funding for new technology ventures in Russia principally comes from 
government funds (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2010). Therefore, IT entrepreneurial firms in 
emerging economies may pursue strategies to obtain formal institutional resources from 







1.2 RESEARCH GAP AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While there is increasing appreciation that PIRs significantly shape firm performance in 
emerging economies (Peng et al. 2008), how PIRs matter remains unclear. Most prior 
studies regard formal political institutions in emerging economies as constraints. They 
focus on risks arising from political institutions (e.g., institutional uncertainty, 
government resource control, government intervention, and regulatory policy uncertainty) 
(Peng and Zhou 2005, Tan and Litschert 1994), and emphasize informal personal 
relationships between firm managers and government officials (i.e., guanxi) as substitutes 
for formal institutional support (e.g., Lee et al. 2001, Li and Zhang 2007, Luo 2003, Peng 
and Heath 1996, Peng and Luo 2000, Sheng et al. 2011, Xin and Pearce 1996). However, 
“institutions need not be viewed solely in terms of their constraining nature, they also 
enable actions that create opportunities for those who understand and use them” (Bruton 
and Ahlstrom 2003, p.237).  
 
A few studies that view political institutions as resources, however, often regard PIRs as 
a generic concept and reported a simple positive effect (e.g., Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001, 
Yiu and Lau 2008). They failed to differentiate among types of PIRs that might bring 
about different effects (Czarnitzki et al. 2011). Ignoring the potential variance that exists 
across types of PIRs can lead to spurious results, especially when some recent case 
studies documented that during institutional changes, some particular PIRs (e.g., political 
affiliation) became liabilities and resulted in organizational failure when entrepreneurial 
firms went IPO (e.g., Sun et al. 2009). Hence, there is a need to distinguish among 
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different types of PIRs and examine their contingent value on contextual variables. 
Nevertheless, studies have rarely examined it. 
 
Acknowledging this critical gap, this thesis explores how PIRs influence the performance 
of IT entrepreneurial firms in emerging economies. Drawing on the institution-based 
view, we develop a typology of PIRs, outline what constitute key types of PIRs to IT 
entrepreneurial firms in emerging economies, and lay down a profound theoretical 
foundation for the effects of PIRs. Next, we choose one type of PIRs, zoom further into 
its sub-types, develop hypothesis, and empirically examine their impacts on IT 
entrepreneurial firm performance. Moreover, PIRs are embedded in institutional contexts 
and may not have the same value for all entrepreneurial firms. Based on resource 
dependence theory, we also provide more insights to see how the effects of PIRs vary in 
terms of institutional contexts. In short, the purpose of this thesis is to address three 
important and related research questions: 
 
(1) What are key types of PIRs to IT entrepreneurial firms in emerging economies? 
 
(2) How do different types of PIRs affect IT entrepreneurial firm performance in 
emerging economies?  
 
(3) Are the relationships between PIRs and IT entrepreneurial firm performance 




1.3 POTENTIAL THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis makes valuable theoretical contributions. First, most previous research on 
PIRs assessed the overall effects of PIRs and suggests positive relationship between PIRs 
and firm performance (e.g., Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001, Yiu and Lau 2008). They did 
not make a distinction among different types of PIRs, nor did they examine the effect of 
each type of PIRs. However, different types of PIRs may affect IT entrepreneurial firm 
performance in different ways (Czarnitzki et al. 2010). This thesis takes an initial step to 
articulate what constitute key types of PIRs. It opens the black box of PIRs which have 
predominately been regarded as a generic concept. This distinction is necessary 
especially when we demonstrate that some PIRs would enhance IT entrepreneurial firm 
performance in emerging economies while others would impede firm performance. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effect of each type of 
PIRs on IT entrepreneurial firm performance in emerging economies. 
 
Second, scholarship increasingly notices the complex interdependences between private 
firms and public institutions (Mahoney et al. 2009). However, studies that investigate the 
interaction between the two are quite scarce. This thesis contributes to the scholarship by 
advancing theories of public-private interaction and by identifying institutional and 
organizational configurations and strategies conducive to intertemporal efficiency and 
value creation (Mahoney et al. 2009). 
 
Third, there is a lack of research that focuses on novel contexts (e.g., emerging-economy 
contexts) and develops innovative theories meaningful to these contexts (Tsui 2007). By 
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studying indigenous issues in emerging economies and building a contingency 
perspective on theoretical underpinnings with special attention to the context of emerging 
economies, this thesis aims to develop a contextualized theory of entrepreneurial strategy 
meaningful to emerging economies and contribute to the global management research 
community (Bruton et al. 2008, Meyer 2006).  
 
1.4 POTENTIAL PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
My thesis has important empirical implications as well. First, it provides valuable 
knowledge to entrepreneurial firms that are striving for survival and growth in emerging 
economies. Not only local entrepreneurs, but also international businesses would be able 
to improve their understanding of how to leverage PIRs in emerging economies.  
 
Second, governments in emerging economies would also benefit from knowing how to 
advance their institutional resources to achieve the goal of increasing the level of 




CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, we first review the literature of three major perspectives on firm 
performance in developed economies. They are the industry-based view, the resource-
based view, and the network-based view. They all assume a relative stable, market-based 
institutional framework. Next, we delineate the characteristics of emerging economies, 
and identify the important role of institutions in these economies. By noticing that 
emerging economies do not have stable institutional frameworks, we posit that the 
insights from the previous three perspectives may not be complete to explain the unique 
phenomena in emerging economies. To address this gap, we draw on an emerging 
perspective – the institution-based view which provides additional insights in the case of 
emerging economies. In the spirit of developing the institution-based view, we further 
propose a new lens that regards political institutions as a major source of key resources in 






2.1 PERFORMANCE OF IT ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS IN DEVELOPED 
ECONOMIES 
Theories of firm performance in the context of developed economies comprise three 
major perspectives: the industry-based view (Porter 1980), the resource-based view 
(Barney 1991), and the network-based view (Brass et al. 2004). 
 
2.1.1 The Industry-based View 
Rooted in industrial organization economics, the industry-based view argues that 
conditions within an industry determine firm strategy and performance (Porter 1980). It 
arises primarily out of research on competition in developed economies (e.g., the United 
States), and assumes a relatively stable, market-based institutional framework (Peng et al. 
2008). The central questions addressed by this perspective concern why and how firms 
achieve abnormal returns within an industry. 
 
Various economics theories have identified a number of factors, such as price, production, 
scale economies, suck costs, and first-mover advantages (Rumelt et al. 1991). Porter 
synthesized these ideas into a coherent framework and formulated a theory of competitive 
strategy (Porter 1980). By delineating the underlying causes of five competitive forces 
(i.e., competitors, customers, suppliers, potential entrants, and substitute products) and 
their influences on an industry’s profitability, Porter emphasized the importance of 
positioning within an industry to achieve sustained competitive advantage (Porter 1996, 
Porter 1998). For example, a firm can get over-normal returns by building defences 
against the competitive forces or finding a position in the industry where the forces are 
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weakest (Porter 2008). A firm can also exploit opportunities during structural change, or 
re-shape industry structure by leading its industry toward new ways of competing that 
alter the five forces for the better (Porter 2008). 
 
Research adopting the industry-based view has found that competition-related and 
industry-related factors affect IT entrepreneurial firm performance. For example, 
evidence from the U.S. microcomputer industry showed that innovation speed relative to 
rivals, local rivalry, and niche switching behaviors together determine firm performance 
in competition (Lawless and Anderson 1996). 
 
2.1.2 The Resource-based View 
While the industry-based view mainly focuses on the market power of firm, it has largely 
ignored the desire of firm managers in achieving firm growth. The resource-based view 
complements the industry-based view and posits that intra-firm resources drive 
competitive advantage (Barney 1991, Penrose 1959). It also assumes that markets work 
smoothly and that institutions are invisible background (Peng et al. 2008). The central 
questions addressed by this perspective concern why firms differ and how they achieve 
and sustain competitive advantage.  
 
The resource-based view defines a firm as an administrative organization with a 
collection of productive resources (physical resources and human resources) (Penrose 
1959) and routines (Nelson and Winter 1982). In this view, firm growth is limited by the 
availability of capable, experienced managers who can fully exploit underutilized 
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resources and routines (Penrose 1959). Firm performance is determined by resources 
acquired and services rendered. First, acquiring resources that are valuable, rare, 
imperfectly inimitable, and non-substitutable provides the owning organization with a 
foundation of sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991). Second, the services that 
firm resources and routines can render, rather than resources and routines themselves, 
further speak to sustained competitive advantage (Penrose 1959).  
 
Research adopting the resource-based view has indicated that financial capital, human 
resources, organizational capabilities, and technological capabilities interact in complex 
ways to influence IT entrepreneurial firm performance (Kaplan 2008, Park et al. 2002, 
Zahra and Nielsen 2002). For example, evidence from emerging fibre-optic 
communications firms in the U.S. shows that CEO cognition, organizational capabilities, 
and organizational incentives together predict firm strategy and performance (Kaplan 
2008). Data from high-tech firms in the U.S. also demonstrated that technological 
capabilities (i.e., radicalness, complexity) and organizational learning activities affect the 
implementation effectiveness of information system (i.e., speed to competence, user 
satisfaction) (Aiman-Smith and Green 2002). 
 
2.1.3 The Network-based View 
Insights from the resource-based view are, nevertheless, constrained due to the narrow 
focus on the internal perspective of firm. Observations that many firms entered a variety 
of inter-organizational relationships (e.g., alliances, joint ventures, and corporate groups) 
have driven researchers to look from an external perspective – the network-based view. 
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The network-based view still assumes a relatively stable, market-based institutional 
framework. The central questions addressed by this perspective concern why firms enter 
inter-organizational relationships and how networks of inter-connected firms evolve.  
 
The network-based view regards firms as embedded within networks of interconnected 
relationships that provide opportunities for and constraints on behavior (Brass et al. 2004, 
Podolny and Page 1998). It acknowledges that no firm is able to possess all the necessary 
resources to undertake growth alone (Mills 1959). Firms must transact with elements of 
the environment in order to obtain the resources necessary for survival. This open-
systems nature of firms consequently brings the existence of firm networks (Scott and 
Davis 2007). Through development of inter-organizational relationships, firms can 
reduce environmental uncertainties, gain access to new technologies and markets, and 
obtain complementary resources and skills (Oliver 1990, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In 
other words, external resources embedded in inter-organizational networks form a major 
contributor to a focal firm’s performance (Inkpen and Tsang 2005). 
 
Research adopting the network-based view has found that financial capital, 
information/knowledge, and other complementary resources from alliance partners, as 
well as social status from partner endorsement, avails to a focal firm in survival and 
growth (Gulati and Higgins 2003, Soh et al. 2004, Stuart 2000). For example, evidence 
from semiconductor firms in the U.S. indicates that because of status-transfer, 
entrepreneurial firms that have large and innovative alliance partners perform better (in 
terms of sales growth and innovation rates) than otherwise comparable firms that lack 
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such partners (Stuart 2000). Another examination on the U.S. computer industry showed 
that resource complementarity and status effects jointly affect firms’ alliance partner 




2.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF EMERGING ECONOMIES 
As researchers increasing probe into emerging economies, it is evident that markets work 
imperfectly and the absence of strong institutions is conspicuous (McMillan 2007). An 
emerging economy is defined as a country that satisfies two criteria: a rapid pace of 
economic development starting from low-income, and government policies favoring 
economic liberalization and the adoption of a free-market system (Hoskisson et al. 2000). 
It is widely accepted that sixty-four countries have been identified as emerging 
economies (Hoskisson et al. 2000). They are mainly in Asia, Latin America, Africa, the 
Middle East, and the Central and Eastern Europe. The pace of political change and the 
size of economic gains have not been uniform across all the emerging economies. 
Nevertheless, they share some common characteristics. 
 
First, the development of institutions in emerging economies is far from mature 
(Hoskisson et al. 2000). As the rules of the game in a society, institutions are defined as 
the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction (North 1990). They are 
made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of 
behavior, conventions, and codes of conduct), and the effectiveness of their enforcement 
(North 1990). Together they define the incentive structure of societies (North 1990).  
 
As Hoskisson et al. (2000, p.249) summarized, many emerging economies, historically, 
were planned economies “ruled by power relations and bureaucratic controls. The state 
curbed opportunism and allocated resources so there was little need for formal laws to 
define exchange relationships among economic actors. Property rights were held and 
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protected by the state; individuals could use assets but did not own them. State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were closely tied to governments, receiving direct financial subsidies 
and indirect preferential treatment. Paternalism, soft budget constraints, and vertical 
bargaining between the governments and the SOEs characterized central planning.” 
These characteristics of emerging economies have lasted for several decades and still 
have profound influence in today’s market.  
 
Although emerging economies are now strengthening their market mechanisms through 
liberalization, stabilization, and the encouragement of private firms (Hoskisson et al. 
2000), the legal infrastructures in these economies are not enough to provide the basis for 
effective corporate governance and business transactions yet. As Hoskisson et al. (2000, 
p.252) pointed out, “Lack of strong legal frameworks has allowed a large increase in 
opportunism, rent shifting, bribery, and corruption (Nelson et al. 1998). These problems 
have particularly affected the ability to enforce property rights even where legislation has 
been enacted (Estrin and Rosevear 1999).” As a result, institutional development was, 
and continues to be, key for cultivating economic growth in emerging economies. 
 
Second, in emerging economies, “Macroeconomic stabilization, a precondition for 
external financial assistance and other resource transactions, has been particularly 
difficult to achieve…Economic and political shocks have greatly increased the 
uncertainty and risk for domestic firms and foreign investors” (Hoskisson et al. 2000, 
p.252). They together result in thin capital markets, shortages of skilled labor, and 




By and large, the unstable market and changing institutions in emerging economies still 
greatly deter resource mobilization. Changes in the fundamental institutional framework 
of norms, values, and taken-for-granted assumptions keep altering the incentive structure 
of a society (North 1990), which consequently affects resource availability in the market 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and firms’ economic choices (Oliver 1997). Institutions 
therefore come into play with organizations in deciding the basic managerial assumptions 
and criteria for decision making (Tan and Litschert 1994). Firms in emerging economies, 
as well as international businesses that have entered or planned to enter, are forced to 
consider how to adapt to the institutional changes and acquire sufficient resources for 




2.3 PERFORMANCE OF IT ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS IN EMERGING 
ECONOMIES 
2.3.1 Limitation of the Prior Three Views 
The three major perspectives arising in the context of developed economies (i.e., 
industry-based, resource-based, and network-based views) assume a stable market or 
treating institutions as control variables (Peng et al. 2008). Researchers have increasingly 
noticed that this assumption hinders strategy research on emerging economies (Peng et al. 
2009). Studies that simply applied the industry-, resource-, and network-based views to 
emerging economies have been criticized for their lack of attention to contexts (Peng et al. 
2009). 
 
In particular, the industry-based view has been criticized for its lack of effort in 
questioning what is behind inter-firm rivalry, while inter-firm rivalry is greatly 
determined by formal government policies and informal media (Dobbin and Dowd 1997, 
Peng et al. 2009). It has been suggested to look beyond the economic task environment 
and explore the interaction among institutions, organizations, and strategic choices (Peng 
and Heath 1996, Peng et al. 2009).  
 
Similarly, the resource-based view has been criticized for its little attention to 
institutional contexts (Priem and Butler 2001). Scholars have challenged that valuable, 
rare, and hard-to-imitate resources in one institutional context may be valueless, plentiful, 
and easy to imitate in other institutional contexts (Brouthers et al. 2008, Peng et al. 2009). 
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It has been suggested to examine the institutional context within which resource selection 
decisions are embedded (Oliver 1997).  
 
Lastly, the network-based view, although it regards influences from other firms as social 
controls (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), has failed to articulate the roles of institutions in the 
social control process. It has been suggested to examine the interdependencies between 
public institutions and private firms, and develop theories of public-private interactions 
(Mahoney et al. 2009). 
 
2.3.2 An Emerging Perspective: The Institution-based View 
To address the above criticisms, the institution-based view has emerged from the new 
institutionalism movement throughout the social sciences in recent decades (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983, North 1990, Peng et al. 2009, Scott 1995). Different from the three 
perspectives above, the institution-based view highlights the role of formal and informal 
institutions, and focuses on the dynamic interaction between institutions and 
organizations (Oliver 1997, Peng et al. 2008, Ring et al. 2005). The central questions 
addressed by this perspective concern why and how institutions matter and how 
organizations dynamically interact with their institutional environments to achieve 
sustained competitive advantage (Mahoney et al. 2009, Noland and Pack 2003, Peng and 
Heath 1996).  
 
The institution-based view regards firms as constrained by the formal and informal 
institutions (North 1990, Peng et al. 2009, Ring et al. 2005). In addition to considering 
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industry level, firm level, and inter-firm level conditions, firms make decisions by 
complying with the incentive structure defined by institutions. The fundamental role of 
institutions is to reduce uncertainty and provide meaning, and hence reduce transaction 
costs (North 1990, Scott 2008). Firms are motivated to comply with the incentive 
structure defined by institutions (Oliver 1997). Preliminary empirical studies showed that, 
country effects, as a proxy for institutional effects, are more salient than other effects in 
explaining the variation in firm performance (Chan et al. 2008, Makino et al. 2004). 
Nevertheless, how institutions matter in emerging economies is far from well-understood 
(Ring et al. 2005). This relative young view is still calling for new theoretical tools to 
capture the complex relationships between organizations and institutions in emerging 
economies, as well as the co-evolution of organizations and institutions (Bruton et al. 
2008, Peng et al. 2008, Tolbert et al. 2011).  
 
We summarize and compare all the four perspectives in Table 2.1. Since our research 
objective is to understand the influences of institutions on IT entrepreneurial firms in 
emerging economies, we take the institution-based view as our main theoretical lens. We 
also incorporate insights from other three perspectives when necessary.  
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Table 2.1: A Comparison among The Four Perspectives 
Perspective Industry-based View Resource-based View Network-based View Institution-based View 
Assumption of 
institutions 
A relatively stable, market-
based institutional 
framework 
A relatively stable, market-
based institutional framework 
A relatively stable, market-based 
institutional framework 




A firm is motivated to 
optimize available 
economic choices 
A firm is motivated to leverage 
its internal productive resources 
and capabilities 
A firm is motivated to leverage 
resources embedded within 
networks of interconnected 
relationships  
A firm is motivated to comply with 
external formal and informal 
pressures 
Focus Product-market barrier to 
competition 
Factor-market impediments to 
resource flows 
Network impediments to resource 
flows 




- Why do firms achieve 
abnormal returns within an 
industry, and how? 
- Why do firms differ? 
- How do firms achieve and 
sustain competitive advantage? 
- Why do firms enter inter-
organizational relationships? 
- How do networks of inter-
connected firms evolve? 
- Why do institutions matter, and 
how?  
- How do organizations 
dynamically interact with 
institutional environments to 





Mobility barrier theory, 
Competitive strategy 
theory 
Dynamic capability theory, 
Organizational learning theory, 
Knowledge-based view, 
Ambidexterity theory, Network 
theory 
Network theory, Status theory, 
Signalling theory, Resource 
dependence theory 
Institutional theory, Resource 
dependence theory 
Implications (1) Abnormal returns are 
rents to market power; 
(2) The creation of such 
market power is seen as 
positioning. 
 
(1) Abnormal returns are rents 
to unique resource 
combinations; 
(2) The creation of such 
resources is seen as 
organizational learning and 
entrepreneurship. 
(1) Abnormal returns are rents to 
unique network structure or inter-
firm relationship; 
(2) The creation of such 
relationships is seen as 
networking and status 
transferring. 
(1) Abnormal returns are rents to 
satisfaction to requirements of the 
institutional environment; 
(2) The creation of such satisfaction 




2.3.3 New Position of the Institution-based View: Institutions as Resources 
Traditionally, the institution-based view regards institutions as constraints on 
organizations. For example, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest organizations are 
largely influenced by external pressures derived from institutions. In the spirit of 
developing the institution-based view, we propose a new position that institutions can 
also be regarded as resources that can be utilized by firms to identify opportunities and 
reduce costs. Although this new position has not been made explicitly by previous 
literature, some researchers’ work provides implicit support to it. For example, North 
(1990, p.7) linked institutions and firm performance as follows: 
 
“Institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic theory, 
determine the opportunities in a society. Organizations are created to take 
advantage of those opportunities. Both the formal and the informal institutional 
constraints result in particular exchange organizations that have come into 
existence because of incentives embodied in the framework and therefore depend 
on it for the profitability of the activities that they undertake.” 
 
Why can institutions be critical resources to firms? This is because, by conforming to 
institutions, firms can earn extra resources and explore potential opportunities in the 
environment. For example, an empirical study on Brazil’s fuel industry showed that firms 
founded during an industrial policy period were more productive than those founded 
before that period (Mingo 2009). The industrial policy created opportunities for firms that 
were founded during the policy period. Moreover, by paying close attention to the 
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payoffs imbedded in institutions, firms can exploit extant resources efficiently and 
promote favoring activities promising the largest profits. For example, firms that had 
received R&D tax credits from government showed significantly better performances on 
innovation than those that had not (Czarnitzki et al. 2010). Tax credits availed firms to 
adjust innovation expenditures to optimize returns on the same set of assets. By and large, 
we establish our new position: By conforming to institutions, firms can make use of 
resources from institutions to further explore new opportunities or exploit current 
resources.  
 
In fact, the new position to view institutions as resources and the traditional position to 
view institutions as constraints are the two sides of a coin. Institutions not only regulate 
the behavior of actors in a given institutional context, but also provide ways by which 
actors can operate (Bruton et al. 2009, Lau et al. 2002, Scott 2001). Despite putting 
constraints on behavior, institutions also clearly define what can be utilized and how. For 
example, “technological standards such as the common Windows platform create a 
number of constraints for developers but Windows also enables more rapid advances by 
creating a standard allowing the sharing of work and information among developers and 
users” (Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003, p.237). Hence, Bruton et al. (2009, p.765) declared 
that “institutions not only create limits for organizations and individuals but also facilitate 
opportunities for action”. Similarly, Ingram and Silverman (2002, p.20) argued that 
“institutions directly determine what arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to 




The new position to view institutions as resources also coincides with the definition of 
resources. Resources refer to any physical or virtual entities that are available and useful  
in  detecting  and responding  to  market  opportunities  or  threats (Sanchez et al. 1996, 
Wade and Hulland 2004). Institutions can be physical (e.g., R&D tax credits) or virtual 
(e.g., technological standards). Moreover, institutions can be used by firms to reduce 
costs and generate profits. For example, the WTO rules and international and domestic 
trade policies and laws have utility as they reduce uncertainty in transactions between 
firms. Other examples include patent policy for patent protection, and government’s 
R&D tax credits for high-tech firms. Therefore, it is reasonable to regard institutions as 
resources. 
 
Although institutions can be viewed as both resources and constraints (Peng et al. 2008), 
institutions as resources that enable firms’ actions have been less commonly examined 
(Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003). Moreover, given the consensus on the importance of 
institutions in emerging economies, we see the opportunity to examine the role of 
institutional resources in affecting firm performance in emerging economies. Before that, 





CHAPTER 3. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES 
 
As a start of theoretical development, this chapter is to provide a basic understanding of 
the nature of political institutional resources. Researchers and practitioners interested in 
the institution-based view have used a variety of different terms to talk about political 
institutional resources, including institutional support (Xin and Pearce 1996), institutional 
capital (Oliver 1997), institutional development (Chan et al. 2008), institutional profile 
(Busenitz et al. 2000), government regulation (Khandwalla 1977), government support 
(Schlevogt 2001), culture explanations (Hamilton and Biggart 1988), and country effect 
(Makino et al. 2004). This proliferation of definitions and classifications has been 
problematic for research using the institution-based view, as it is often unclear what 
researchers mean by key terminology. In order to simplify the interpretation of the 







3.1 DEFINITION OF INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES 
In this thesis, we define institutional resources as available assets and capitals derived 
from or defined by institutions in a society. To an IT entrepreneurial firm, institutional 
resources are anything tangible (e.g., financial support from government) or intangible 
(e.g., enforced patent and copyright protection) from institutions that a firm can use in its 
processes for creating, producing, and/or offering its products (goods or services) to a 
market (Sanchez et al. 1996). 
 
Following prior research’s classification of institutions (i.e., political institutions, 
economic institutions, and social institutions) (Chan et al. 2008, North 1990, Scott 1995), 
we classify institutional resources into three kinds accordingly (i.e., political institutional 
resources, economic institutional resources, and social institutional resources).  
 
Political institutional resources (PIRs) are institutional resources derived from 
governments and government-affiliated organizations (Chan et al. 2008). PIRs can be 
R&D tax credit determined by policy, direct investment from government, and protection 
from government (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994, Czarnitzki et al. 2010, Djankov et al. 
2002, Lee and Osteryoung 2001). 
 
Economic institutional resources (EIRs) are institutional resources derived from market 
intermediaries (e.g., venture capitalists, investment bankers, auditors, solicitors, 
consultants, brokers, traders, and dealers) (Chan et al. 2008). EIRs can be credit from 
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banks, endorsement from underwriters, and management experience from venture 
capitals (Arikan and Capron 2010, Carter and Manaster 1990, Stuart et al. 1999).  
 
Social institutional resources (SIRs) are those derived from the members of a population 
associating and interacting extensively with one another to develop recursive practices 
(Chan et al. 2008), such as partners, industry associations, and rivals. SIRs can be trust 
from clients, social status conveyed by partners, and technology developed in R&D 
collaborators (Alvarez and Barney 1993, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996, Gulati and 














3.2 INFLUENCE ON INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES 
3.2.1 Literature Review on Institutional Resources 
To identify the effects of institutional resources, we conducted a comprehensive literature 
review following the procedure suggested by Heugens and Lander (2009) and Bruton et 
al. (2008). It contained four complementary literature retrieval procedures to identify 
studies that have examined the influence of one or more types of institutional resources 
on entrepreneurial firm performance.  
 
First, we employed keyword search in databases such as ABI/INFORM Global, EBSCO, 
JSTOR, ProQest, ScienceDirect, and Wiley Online Library. We used the following 
keywords for institutional resources: institution, institutional, political capital, 
government support, inter-organizational networks, and social ties. We used the 
following keywords for entrepreneurial firms: entrepreneur, entrepreneurial, 
entrepreneurship, new ventures, start-ups, and young firms. Second, we conducted 
manual searches of 24 top-tier journals ranked by the University of Texas at Dallas. We 
also searched in journals that are specialized on institutions or entrepreneurship, or are 
published in emerging economies, such as Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 
Journal of Business Venturing, Management and Organization Review, Research Policy, 
and Small Business Economics. Third, we used a two-way snowball technique by 
backward-tracing all references reported in the articles identified in the first two steps and 
by forward-tracing all articles that cited the original articles using ISI Web of Knowledge. 
Fourth, we only selected those studies that have investigated the relationship between 
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institutional-level resources and entrepreneurial firm performance. Studies that simply 
regarded institutions as constraints or pressures were eliminated from results. Those that 
only used institutions as control variables were excluded as well.  
 
In all, these efforts yielded a database of 39 studies. Table 3.1 summarizes these studies. 
Among the 39 studies, 22 adopted firm as the unit of analysis, while others adopted 
individual-level or macro-level. Twelve studies out of the 22 studies focused on emerging 
economies. 
 
Beyond the 39 studies, we also identified another 43 studies that have examined 
institutional-level resources on non-entrepreneurial firms. As they may also form the 




Table 3.1: A Summary of Studies on Institutional-level Antecedents of Entrepreneurial Firm Performance 
Source Paper 
Type 
















Country - Regulatory: rapid change in the 
regulatory institutions 
- Normative: strong role of 
government 
- Cognitive: credentials of high 
tech entrepreneurs 
- Firm registration 
- Social penalty for 
business failure 
- Firm growth 
The Russian government is an 
increasingly important source of 















Country - Financial capital 
- Educational capital  
- Regulatory protection 
- Regulatory complexity 
- Level of corruption 
Proportion of high-
growth entrepreneurship 
A country’s developed 
institutions targeted at 
entrepreneurship (e.g., greater 
availability of venture capital) 











Country National innovation systems Radical innovation - Taiwan: Government-supported 
technological and scientific 
research institutes; government-
driven venture capital industry. 
- Korea: technical compatibility 
standards; government support; 
association with the central 
authority of the large business 













Summary of Findings 









Country - A fast bankruptcy procedure 
- A low cost for bankruptcy filing 
- A fresh start in liquidation 
- An automatic stay of assets 
- Managers stay on the job 
Entrepreneurship 
development (new firm 
entry rate) 
Making bankruptcy laws more 
entrepreneur-friendly will 
positively affect 
entrepreneurship development by 














Country - Education EFC (entrepreneurial 
framework conditions) 
- Opportunity perception
- Entrepreneurial skills 
- Entrepreneurial type 
Exogenous structural conditions 
regulate the perception of 
opportunity and the availability 











Country - Availability of reorganization 
- A fast bankruptcy procedure 
- A fresh start in liquidation 
- A low cost for bankruptcy filing 
- An automatic stay of assets 
- Managers stay on the job 
Entrepreneur-friendliness 
of bankruptcy laws 
Formal institutions can 
encourage more entrepreneurs to 








Country - Private property 
- Network-based trust 
- Blat or Guanxi  
N.A. - Social capital through networks 
facilitates necessities as 
obtaining licences or permits to 
build facilities, winning 
government contracts, and 
securing financing from 
government-owned banks. 



















Country Institutional structures - Governments’ 
capabilities to foster 
industry creation 
- Firms’ innovation 
strategies. 
- It assumes the presence of 
developed, capitalist economies. 
- Strength of state institutions 
can amplify or compromise 








of 45 states 







State - Centralized institutors (state 
solar incentives) 
- Decentralized institutions 
(norms of environmentally 
responsible consumption; norms 
of conformity; norms of family 
interdependence) 
- Solar firm founding 
rate 
- Higher social norms have 
higher levels of entrepreneurial 
founding in support of 
environmental practices. 
- State-supported incentives 








on 666 firm 
registrations 






State - Social movement organization 
membership 
- Regulatory environment 
Nascent entrepreneurial 
activity 
As social resources, social 
movements construct and 
propagate cognitive frameworks, 
norms, values, and regulatory 





prey model of 
knowledge 
spillovers 
Industry - Strategies of idea-creating 
incumbent firms  
- Strategies of knowledge 
spillover-appropriating 
entrepreneurs 
- public policies implemented by 
government 
Coexistence, possible 
coexistence, cyclical, and 
destructive equilibria 
Governments ought to adopt a 
dynamic policy stance, initially 
implementing policies that favor 
incumbents before shifting their 


























Firm Networking skills of 
entrepreneurs 
- Structural holes in the 
entrepreneur’s network 
- Venture’s legitimacy 
(the number of investors)
Polished social skills of 
entrepreneurs help their firms 
gain central network positions 















Firm - Alliance network at founding 
- Network efficiency at founding 
- Potential rival partner 
Firm performance - An efficient network provides 
access to diverse information and 
capabilities with minimum costs 
of redundancy, conflict, and 
complexity. 
- Allying with potential rivals 
provide opportunity for learning 
and less risk of intra-alliance 
rivalry. 







in the U.S. 






Firm - Legal institutions: investor 
protection 
- Board independence 
- UK vs. US 
Foreign IPO success A country’s investor protection 
level relates to the extent that a 
country possesses institutions 
that protect the rights of minority 































Firm - Concentrated economic power 
vs. diffuse ownership structures 




Institutions both regulate the 
behavior of actors in a given 
institutional arena and provide 












Firm - Industry 
- Human capital 
- Opportunity (IP protection, 
Need permits) 
- Performance (number of 
employees, age) 
- Organizational form 
- Legitimization activities 
(complete plan, establish legal 
entity) 
- Venture disbanding 
hazard 
- Product development 
hazard 
- Marketing hazard 
- Inputs hazard 
- Customers hazard 
- Ask for funds hazard 
Legitimacy is likely to have its 
greatest effect on venture 
survival during the earliest 
period of the venture’s life 
because this period is the one in 
which disbanding depends most 
on the perceptions of external 
stakeholders, rather than on 













Firm - Normative: Political constraint 
- Regulative: Technology support 
- Cognitive: Business regulatory 
support 
Bricolage Bricolage acts as a legitimating 




























Firm - Endorsement by venture capital 
firms 
- Endorsement by investment 
banks 
- Downstream strategic alliance 
- Equity market conditions 
IPO success - Networks with well-established 
firms are able to access to 
valuable information and 
capabilities. 
- Networks are beneficial to 
firms by signalling the quality of 
















Firm - Founder’s direct/indirect tie 
- Founder’s human capital 
- Organization’s developed 
direct/indirect ties 
- Organization’s developed status 
Tie formation An organization’s status, the 
connections of an organization’s 
top management team and board 
members, and an organization’s 
winning of awards all signal the 
quality of an organization and its 
resources. 












Firm - Entrepreneurial orientation 
- Tech capabilities (patents, 
quality control capabilities) 
- Financial resources 
- Partnership-based linkages (to 
other firms, venture capitals, 
universities, venture associations);  
- Sponsorship-based linkages (to 
banks, government agencies) 
Firm performance 
(ROA) 
- Partnership-based linkages 
provide information, knowledge, 
complementary resources, 
financial resources, legitimacy, 
and resources from third parties. 
- Sponsorship-based linkages 
provide governmental R&D 
funding, and access to loans at 



























Firm - Product innovation strategy 
- Dysfunctional competition 
- Institutional support 
- Environmental turbulence 
- Strategic alliance for product 
development 
- Political networking 
Firm performance 
(financial and market 
performance) 
- Beneficial policies and 
programs. 
- Needed technology information 
and technology support. 
- Financial support. 
- License for imports of 

















Firm - Environmental uncertainty 
- Institutional support 
- Perceived industry growth 
- R&D expenditure 
- Product development alliance 
Firm performance - Beneficial policies and 
programs. 
- Technology information and 
other technical support. 
- Financial support. 
- Licenses for import of 
technology manufacturing and 
raw material, and other 
equipment. 














Firm - Political networking 
- Functional experience 
- Ownership 
- Dysfunctional competition 
Firm performance Government controls significant 
portions of strategic factor 
resources and has considerable 












Summary of Findings 
(Stewart 







s in the U.S. 







Individual - Rate of environmental change 
- Strategic uncertainty 
- Accessibility 
Scanning frequency of 
entrepreneurs 
Indian entrepreneurs scan more 













Firm - Prominence of strategic alliance 
partners 
- Prominence of investment bank 
- Uncertainty of the firm quality 
- Time to IPO 
- Market value 
Endorsement from partners or 
investment banks indicates their 
reciprocal relationships with, 
quality assessment of, and 




















Firm - Sales of tech-related partners 
- Innovativeness of tech-related 
partners 
- Firm age 
- Firm sales 
- Patent rate 
- Growth rate 
Alliances are both pathways for 
the exchange of resources and 



























Firm - Education abroad 
- Number of patents 
- Practical business knowledge 
abroad 
- Experience in multi-national 
companies 
- Previous ownership abroad 
- Business networks abroad 
 - Location of ventures: 
university park vs. non-
university park 
- Firm performance 
(employment growth, 
satisfaction with firm 
performance) 
- University science parks offer 
access to scientists, new 
inventions, and laboratories. 
- Non-university science park 
offer expertise in 
commercialization. 
- In China, once firms in a 
science park are qualified as 
high-tech firms, they receive 













Firm - Ratio of state shares 








The government’s roles as both 
an investor and a resource 
allocation coordinator 
complicate the relationship 
between ownership structure and 

















Firm - Political capital (government 
support) 
- Social capital (strategic alliance 
ties) 









- Relative firm 
performance 
- Political capital has the 
strongest positive relationship 
with corporate entrepreneurship, 
followed by reputational capital. 
- Social capital may lead to 
specific objectives rather than 












Summary of Findings 











Firm - Technological capabilities 
- Management capabilities 
- Business and institutional 
network ties 
- Home industry competition 
- Export intensity 
- Corporate 
entrepreneurship 
- International venturing 
Institutional network ties with 
various domestic institutions 
(such as government officials 
and agencies, banks and 
financial institutions, 
universities, and trade 
associations) provide firms with 
resources (such as government 








on 119 firms 
in the U.S. 
Resource-
based view 
Firm - Internal human resources 
- External human resources 
- Internal manufacturing 
- Outsourcing & licensing 
- Alliances & joint ventures 
- Formal involvement 
- Formal coordination integration 





Interactions with suppliers and 
other external groups improve 
the manufacturing function’s 
learning about the industry’s best 















Firm - Ties with service intermediaries 
(i.e., technology service firms, 
accounting and financial service 
firms, law firms, and talent search 
firms) 
- Perceived industry growth 
- Environmental uncertainty 
- Product innovation Ties with regional institutions – 
service intermediaries enable 
new ventures to conduct broad 
external innovation search and 
also reduce costs associated with 
locating external sources of 





























Firm - Institutional dissimilarity 
between countries 
Using network vs. 
market methods to 
approach investors 
Chinese culture with an 
emphasis on social obligation, 
the relatively immature 
legal/regulatory framework in 
China, and the costs and 
availability of financial capital 
through formal market channels 
would lead to more networks 









Individual - Prior experience 






influences how entrepreneurs 
envision and rationalize the 
opportunity for a novel venture. 
(Gohman











Individual - Economic freedom (government 
size, legal structure and property 
rights, access to sound money, 
free international trade, regulation 
of credit, labor, and business) 
- Corruption 
Entrepreneurial activities - Great economic freedom 
reduces costs of self-employed. 
- Lower corruption increases 
efficiency by lowering 
administrative costs in dealing 
with corrupt bureaucrats. 















Individual - Legal system (property rights, regulation complexity) 
- Financial system (bank vs. 
equity) 
- Education system (schooling 
year) 
- Trust relations (corruption) 
- Venture creation 
decision 
- Venture arrangements 
scripts 
- Venture willingness 
scripts 
- Venture ability scripts 
Institutional environment shapes 
entrepreneurial cognitions and 



























Multilevel - Human capital 
- Bribery 
Firm performance (total 
revenues) 
Bribery facilitates firm 
performance by: 
- reducing delay in moving files 
in administrative offices; 
- relaxing of audits and 
inspections; 
- offering advice on legal ways 






Multilevel - Fragmented collective actions of 
governments 
- Governments intervention 
Entrepreneurial activities - Fragmented institutional 
environments give organizations 
more freedom to make strategic 
choices. 
- Governments intervene in the 
allocation of resources such as 













Multilevel - Institutional incongruence 
- Weak enforcement of formal 
institutions 
- A group’s collective identity 





- A realm of opportunities exists 
for entrepreneurs willing to 
operate outside formal 
institutional boundaries. 
- A group with a strong identity 
can enhance cooperation among 
members and provide access to 
resources and markets. 




Table 3.2: A Summary of Studies on Institutional-level Antecedents of Firm Performance (Non-entrepreneurial firms) 
Source Paper 
Type 
























Country Developing measurement for 
institutional profile of 
entrepreneurship: regulatory, 
cognitive, and normative 
dimensions 
N.A. Country-level institutional 
differences contribute to levels 









Country - Institutional characteristics  
- Institutional capabilities 
- Conditions of best fit 
- Stakeholder adjustment 
Variations in national 
industrial 
competitiveness 
Institutional governance systems 
determine industry activities and 








Country - Economic centralization 




- Government involvement both 
benefits and hurts technology 
development.  
- Domestic business groups act 
as substitutes for governmental 
intervention. 
























Firm - Social capital from government 
officials 
- Social capital from community 
leaders 
- Social capital from top managers 
at other firms 
- Low-cost vs. differentiation 
strategy 
Firm performance 
(Growth of sales and 
revenues; Growth of net 
income; ROA, ROS, 
Growth in productivity) 
- Inadequate market supporting 
institutions and weak 
enforcement capacity of 
regulatory and legal institutions 
in Ghana. 
- Strong traditional institutions 
such as kingship, chieftaincy, 


















Firm - Institutional linkages to 
legitimated community 
- Institutional linkages to public 
institutions 
- Organizational characteristics 
- Organizational transformation 
Organizational mortality Institutional linkages signal 
invulnerability to questioning, 
legitimacy and status, stability 
and predictability, and ease of 















Firm Institutional formation or 
discontinuity 
Firm’s actions on rivals’ 
resources in factor 
markets or political 
markets 
Institutional formation or 
discontinuity provides firms with 
more opportunities to shape 

























Firm Institutional development - Foreign affiliate 
performance  
- Variation in foreign 
affiliate performance 
Economic, political, and social 
institutions provide different 








of 362 new 
technology 
firms in the 





Firm - Legal systems of countries 
- Political risk 
- IP rights protection 
- Previous experience in 
international business 
- Foreign entry 
- Entry ranking 
Regulation particularly plays a 
decisive and direct role in 
property rights, which are critical 
for firms developing abroad their 
competitive advantage embedded 















Firm - Channels of information flow 
from public research to industrial 
R&D 
Firm size 
- Percentage of R&D 
Projects using Public 
Research 
- Suggesting new R&D 
projects 





Public research institutions are 
an important source of 











Summary of Findings 
(Czarnitz







ng firms in 
Canada 




Firm R&D tax credits - Innovation output (in 
national and international 
market) 
- New product number 
- New product sales 
Tax credits reduce the marginal 















Firm - Number of Competitors  
- Market-stage 
- Technical Innovation Strategy 
- Top management team 
Rate of alliance 
formation 
Top management teams provide 






















Firm Public R&D support Private R&D investment - Firms do not substitute public 
funds with private R&D 
investment. 
- Small firms might not have 
engaged in R&D activities in the 


















Firm - Degree of dependence 
- Corporatism/pluralism 
- Diversification level 
- Nature of issue 
- Issue life cycle 
- Firm resources 
- Political strategy  - Government and policies are 
critical sources of uncertainty for 
firms and have control over 
critical resources.  
- Government decision makers 
have the ability to alter the size 
of markets; to affect the structure 
of market; to alter the cost 
structure of firms; and to affect 







on 300 firms 







Firm - Politicians on the board of 
directors 
- Regulated industries 
Firm performance 
(Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROS) 
Ex-politicians on boards provide 
legitimacy, unique information 
about the public policy process, 
and access to existing politicians, 
bureaucrats, and other political 







of 121 firms 







Firm Institutional environment Alliance partner 
selection decisions 
Institutional environment affect 












Summary of Findings 
(Hoskiss
on et al. 
2000) 







Firm  N.A.  N.A. - Institutions reduce transaction 
costs and information costs.  
- Good relationships with 
government give tangible 
benefits (e.g., access to licenses) 
and protect firms against entry 
by foreign firms 











Firm - Managerial ties with other firms 
and government 
- Competitive intensity 
- Structural uncertainty 
- Domestic vs. foreign firms 
Firm performance 
(ROA) 
Managers form networks and ties 
to obtain access to scarce 
resources and information and 
reduce uncertainty. 




















Firm - Differentiation 
- Low-cost 




Political ties help firms achieve 
more institutional support, such 
as interpreting regulations, 
enforcing contracts, settling 












Summary of Findings 





of 195 firms 
in the U.S. 
- Resource-
based view  
- Institutional 
perspective 
Firm - Resource complementarity 
- Asymmetry in social status 
- Asymmetry in network status  
- Firm age 
- Environmental Dynamism 
Firm performance 
(ROA) 
- Legitimacy is considered as 
inseparable asset of 
organizations. 
- Legitimacy provides critical 
social resources that facilitate 
and complement financial and 
physical resources. 
- Legitimacy can be procured 
through firms’ social activities, 













Firm - Structural uncertainty 
- Industrial growth 
- Industrial regulation 
- Competitive pressure 
- Capacity utilization 
- Strategic proactiveness 
Managerial networking 
with other firms and 
government 
Networking serves as a catalyst 
for acquiring exceptions from 









Firm Political antecedents - Corporate political 
activity (CPA) 
- Firm performance 




Government contracts and sales 




























Firm - Input supporting government 
policies 
- Marketing supporting 
government policies 
- Organizational learning 
- Reverse engineering 
- Manufacturing flexibility 
Firm Performance Government agencies in 
emerging economies: 
- help firms in technology 
identification, selection and 
implementation. 
- apply a range of specific policy 
instruments including financial 















based view  
- Resource-
based view 
Firm - Tangible resources 
- Intangible resources 
- Market-supporting institutional 
strength 
Entry mode (Greefield 
vs. acquisition vs. joint-
venture) 
Market-supporting institutions 
concerns business freedom, trade 
freedom, property rights, 














Firm - Ties to government 
- Ties to state-owned enterprises 
(SOE) 
- Firm performance 
(ROA)  
Ties to SOEs facilitate access to 
valuable resources that the 
government has placed under the 




























Firm - Ownership structure 
- Location 
- Size 
- Management skills 
- Technology skills 





Organizations in China receive 
different treatment and resource 
allocations from the government 
depending on their institutional 










Firm N.A. N.A. Given the institutional 
constraints in emerging 
economies, firms settle on a 
network-based strategy of 
growth, building on personal 














Firm - Managerial ties with top 
managers at other firms 
- Managerial ties with 
government officials 
- Ownership 
- Business sector 
- Size 
- Industry growth 
Firm performance (ROA, 
market share) 
- Social capital embedded in 
managerial ties is a valuable, 
unique, and intangible resource 
that is difficult to replicate. 
- Managerial ties help reduce 
























Firm - Decrease in political institution 
(government resource control, 
intervention, regulatory policy 
uncertainty) 
- Increase in legal institutions 
(comprehensiveness of legal 
frameworks, effectiveness of legal 
frameworks) 
B2G/B2B relationships 
changing from strong ties 
to weak ties 
Various dimensions of 
institutional transitions – 
political and legal – shape the 
content of different networks 






based view of 
strategy  
Firm - Industry-based competition 
- Firm-specific resources and 
capabilities 
- Institution conditions and 
transitions 
- Firm strategy 
- Firm performance 
The combination of formal and 
informal institutional 





















Firm - Government support 
- Firm size 
- Environmental constraints 
- Private ownership 





The impact of government 
support is more important in 
Beijing than in Shanghai, and 



























Firm - Business ties 
- Political ties 
- Institutional environment 
(enforcement inefficiency, 
government support) 
- Market environment 
(technological turbulence, 
demand uncertainty) 
Firm performance - Business ties provide firms 
with market information, 
learning and mutual adjustment 
between partners, and network 
legitimacy. 
- Political ties provide firms with 
policy information, scarce 
















- The agency 
theory 
Firm - Rent appropriation by both 
political institutions and the 
management 
- Divergence between 
shareholding rights and control 
rights for a government 
controlling shareholder  
 - Organizational failure 
- Managerial agency 
problem 
- Institutional affiliation to local 
government supported Kelon to 
grow, but resulted in 
organizational failure when 
Kelon went IPO. 
- Political actors may grad an 
unduly large portion of the rents 














Firm Shift in competitive environment 
towards market forces 
The value of 
embeddedness in a local 
political network 
- The central government in 
China carries out strategic 
industrial policy.  
- The local governments 
maximize local fiscal revenue 
and generate employment 






















on 419 firms 
in the U.S. 
Signalling 
theory 
Firm - CEO’s shareholdings 
- CEO’s external directorships 
- CEO’s tenure 
- CEO and prior financial 
statement 
Abnormal returns Reputation spillover: CEO 














data on 7 




Firm - Skilfulness in Symbolic Action 
- Variety of symbolic action 
conveying (Personal credibility; 
Professional organizing, 
Organizational achievement; and 
Stakeholder relationship quality) 
- Frequency of Symbolic Action 
- Resource provider’s structural 
similarity 





Resource Acquisition Ties with prestigious outsiders 






























- General partnering experience 
(GPE) 
- Partner-specific experience 
(PSE) 
- Partner distinctiveness 
- Technological firm resources 
- Financial firm resources 
- Firm-specific uncertainty 
Cumulative abnormal 
returns 
- Benefits of GPE: alliance 
management skills, routines, 
knowledge-sharing practices, 
awareness of potential partnering 
hazards and safeguards. 
- Benefits of PSE: mutual trust, 
reciprocity, knowledge-sharing 
routines, and mutually agreed 
conflict resolution mechanisms. 














- Supplier Dependence 
- Supplier Social Capital (with 
business-partner and Governing-
agency) 





- In transitional economies, the 
regulatory power of governments 
dictates project approval and 
resource allocations.  
- Personal connections with 
government officials can grant a 
firm access to additional 
resources and inside information, 
and increase the firm’s power in 
dealing with other related firms. 
(Batjarga















Investment - Dyadic ties of entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists 
- Triad ties of entrepreneurs, 
referrals, and venture capitalists 
Investment selection 
decisions 
Financial institutions provide 



























Investment - Social ties 
- Reputation 
Investment Decision Reputation helps disentangle the 
effects of social obligation and 




















Individual - Depth of human and social 
capital 
- Breadth of human and social 
capital 
- Time/deterioration 
The likelihood of a 
former government 
official to join a board as 
an outside director 
- A “government insider” on a 
board can provide valuable 
nonbusiness perspectives on 
issues, intimate knowledge of the 
public policy process, 
legitimacy, and access to key 
decision makers still in 
government. 
- A director’s human and social 



















- Trust in connections 
- Nonreciprocated gifts 
















based view  
- Resource-
based view 
Multilevel - Firm’s cultural norms and values 
- Political support of the top 
management team 
- Increase of existing power of 
key decision-makers 
- Resource rules and standards in 
an industry 
- Social and professional 




The social context within which 
resource selection decisions are 
embedded (e.g., firm traditions, 
network ties, regulatory 
pressures) might affect 

















Multilevel - Intellectual Human Capital and 
Star Scientists 
- R&D Capability 
- Biotech Alliances with 
universities, research institutions, 
and other firms  
- Biotech Acquisitions 
Innovative output 
(patent) 
Network-level alliances and 
acquisitions of new technology 
ventures, together with 
individual- or firm level 
resources, have compensating or 
reinforcing effects on firm-level 
innovative output. 





3.2.2 Summary of Political Institutional Resources (PIRs) 
Prior studies have investigated a set of variables pertinent to PIRs. The variables include 
financial support from government (Czarnitzki et al. 2010, Lee et al. 2001), state-owned 
resources for production (Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001), government sales (Busenitz et al. 
2000, Lux et al. 2011), regulatory support (Desa 2011, Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001, Lux 
et al. 2011), information and human resources from government (Li and Atuahene-Gima 
2001, Yiu and Lau 2008), and political embeddedness (Delmar and Shane 2004, Hillman 
2005, Lee et al. 2001, Michelson 2007, Okhmatovskiy 2010, Sun et al. 2010, Wu et al. 
2012, Yiu and Lau 2008).  
 
Based on these studies, we mainly get two conclusions. First, it is worth noting that the 
importance of PIRs may be different between developed economies and emerging 
economies (Lee et al. 2001). In developed economies, due to the mature free-market 
institutions and relatively weak control of government, PIRs are not key resources for IT 
entrepreneurial firms for survival and development (Hillman et al. 2009). However, in 
emerging economies, government is an increasingly important source of funds for IT 
industry (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2010, Li and Zhang 2007, Ring et al. 2005). As a result, 
in emerging economies, PIRs are extremely crucial for IT entrepreneurial firms to 
overcome the immature market intermediates and to respond to institutional environment 
change (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2010, Lee and Osteryoung 2001, Yiu and Lau 2008). 
While there is increasing appreciation that PIRs significantly shape IT entrepreneurial 





Second, various variables pertinent to PIRs imply that there are many types of PIRs. 
Different types of PIRs may affect IT entrepreneurial firm performance in different ways 
(Czarnitzki et al. 2010). However, the multi-dimensional nature of PIRs has been largely 
neglected. Most prior empirical studies, reporting a positive effect of PIRs on firm 
performance, either regard PIRs as a generic concept (e.g., Lee et al. 2001, Li and 
Atuahene-Gima 2001, Yiu and Lau 2008), or focus on one specific type of PIRs (e.g., 
Sun et al. 2010). The positive effect of PIRs might not hold for all types of PIRs. For 
example, Okhmatovskiy (2010) found that firms’ political embeddedness in networks of 
state-owned enterprises are associated with higher profitability, while no significant 
differences are discovered for political embeddedness in networks of government 
agencies. This is because political embeddedness in networks of government agencies is 
associated with both benefits and costs (Okhmatovskiy 2010, Wu et al. 2012). Moreover, 
Sun et al. (2010) found case evidence that the positive effect of political embeddedness 
may even change into negative under some situations. Hence, not all types of PIRs lead 
to better firm performance. There is a need to distinguish among different types of PIRs 
and to compare their different effects. However, few studies have explicitly examined the 
negative effects of PIRs. 
 
3.2.3 Summary of Economic Institutional Resources (EIRs) 
Prior studies have also investigated a set of variables pertinent to EIRs. The variables 
include financial capital from investment banks or venture capitals (Gulati and Higgins 
2003, Lee et al. 2001), services and experiences from market intermediaries (Zhang and 
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Li 2010), and endorsement from market intermediaries (Batjargal 2010, Gulati and 
Higgins 2003, Stuart 2000, Stuart et al. 1999). Market intermediaries for IT 
entrepreneurial firms mainly include venture capitalists, investment bankers, technology 
service firms, accounting and financial firms, law firms, and talent search firms (Chan et 
al. 2008, Zhang and Li 2010). In developed economies, it is found that EIRs positively 
affect entrepreneurial firm performance (Gulati and Higgins 2003, Lee et al. 2001).  
 
In emerging economies, on the one hand, similar positive effects may still hold because 
financial capital, experiences, and endorsement from market intermediaries help firms in 
emerging economies overcome insurmountable handicap of resource deficiency, gain 
knowledge and experiences, and enlarge search of innovation. In particular, in emerging 
economies, due to the low level of managerial sophistication of IT entrepreneurial firms, 
market intermediaries can provide specialized expertise to IT entrepreneurial firms to 
help solve managerial problems. In this way, market intermediaries help IT 
entrepreneurial firms “focus on their chosen steeple of expertise, rather than dissipate 
their energies across a broad range of peripheral or supporting activities” (Bahrami and 
Evans 1995, p.68). Market intermediaries can also educate senior managers on how to 
value their firm, and provide strategic and operating advice to the firm (Bruton and 
Ahlstrom 2003). Moreover, market intermediaries who sit at the intersection of many 
firms and organizations can maintain extensive networks of ties to different parts of an 
emerging economy, facilitate entrepreneurial firms to broaden external search of 
knowledge and resources, connect entrepreneurial firms with buyers and suppliers, and 
reduce costs associated with locating external key resources for innovation (Bruton and 
63 
 
Ahlstrom 2003, Zhang and Li 2010). In addition, in emerging economies, due to the 
formal institutional voids, endorsement from reputable market intermediaries could help 
transfer their social status, reputation, and customer trust to IT entrepreneurial firms 
(Puffer et al. 2010). Hence, the positive effects of EIRs are expected to remain for IT 
entrepreneurial firms in emerging economies. 
 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the economic institutions in emerging 
economies are relatively weaker than in developed economies. The ways of operating 
economic institutions in emerging economies may be different from the way of operating 
their counterparts in developed economies. Take the operation of venture capitalists in 
emerging economies as an example. Venture capitalists in emerging economies mostly 
take a majority in the entrepreneurial firm, which is unusual for venture capitalists in the 
U.S. (Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003). They may exploit excessive value from IT 
entrepreneurial firms by taking a majority of equity and abnormally diluting technology 
stocks. By doing this, they may dampen the morale of technical entrepreneurs, and harm 
firm performance in the long run. Furthermore, although venture capitalists are 
expanding their business in China’s IT industry, it is still difficult for them to conduct 
due-diligence and monitor firms (Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003). The unbalance between the 
fast-development of venture capitalists and their inability to assure firm quality may 
result in low-quality investment decision and even speed up the failure of IT 
entrepreneurial firms. Hence, the importance of EIRs in emerging economies may not be 




3.2.4 Summary of Social Institutional Resources (SIRs) 
Prior studies have investigated a set of variables pertinent to SIRs as well. The variables 
include shared financial capital from alliance partners (Baum et al. 2000), transferred 
technology from alliance partners, universities, or research institutes (Gulati 1999, 
Steensma and Gorley 2000, Stuart 2000, Yiu and Lau 2008), complementary resources 
from alliance partners (Lee et al. 2001), social status (Lin et al. 2009, Stuart 2000, Stuart 
et al. 1999), reputation (Shane and Cable 2002, Stuart 2000, Stuart et al. 1999), 
trustworthiness (Alvarez and Barney 1993, Gulati 1999), diverse information and 
capabilities (Baum et al. 2000), and normative value for innovation and entrepreneurship 
(Busenitz et al. 2000). In developed economies, when allying with partners, IT 
entrepreneurial firms can get access to complementary resources and diverse information, 
and gain critical social status, reputation, and trustworthiness that facilitate further 
transactions.  
 
In emerging economies, the positive effects of SIRs may still hold. Shared financial 
capital, transferred technology, and other complementary resources from alliance partners 
provide key resources for IT entrepreneurial firms. For example, an efficient network 
provides access to diverse resources and capabilities with minimum costs of redundancy, 
conflict, and complexity (Baum et al. 2000). Allying with potential rivals also provides 
opportunity for learning and less risk of intra-alliance rivalry (Baum et al. 2000). These 
benefits are extremely vital for IT entrepreneurial firms due to the immature market 
intermediaries in emerging economies. Moreover, in emerging economies, private firms 
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usually do not have resources sufficient for research and development. They can make 
use of technology developed by partners. 
 
However, it is also possible that alliances with business partners are not influential in 
emerging economies because business partners also face potential institutional changes 
and could not secure resources and predict performance of IT entrepreneurial firms. For 
example, Yiu and Lau (2008)’s study showed that in China, social support from strategic 
alliances does not have a significant relationship with entrepreneurial firm performance, 
when adding political support in. They argued this non-significance of social support 
might be attributed to that social support from technological and marketing alliances is 
more related to specific firm performance such as technological or market development, 
instead of overall firm performance. Nevertheless, their counter-intuitive results, in my 
view, are not well explained because overall firm performance should be highly 
correlated with technological or market development. A more plausible reason could be 
the relative smaller power of social support from firms in alliances compared to political 










3.3 HIGHLIGHTING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES IN 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 
Based on the review above, we discern that the most prominent difference between 
emerging and developed economies lies in PIRs. This is because the mature free-market 
in developed economies has already provided plenty of resources to firms. The control of 
government on resources is relatively weak. Although firms in developed economies are 
also observed to conduct corporate political activities to gain more resources (Lux et al. 
2011), entrepreneurial firms with strong EIRs or SIRs but weak PIRs could also survive 
and grow. However, in emerging economies, government controls significant portions of 
strategic factor resources and has considerable power to approve projects and allocate 
resources (Li and Zhang 2007). As a result, in emerging economies, PIRs become more 
crucial than EIRs or SIRs. For example, Yiu and Lau (2008) showed that in emerging 
economies, political institutional support (in terms of government loans and tax relief) 
has a strong positive relationship with entrepreneurial firm performance while social 
capital (in terms of the number of strategic alliances) does not.  
 
Besides literature review, we also managed to conduct face-to-face interviews with CEOs 
of 11 IT entrepreneurial firms in Shanghai, China. Each interview lasted 1-2 hours. These 
interviews echoed the literature on the importance of political institutional resources. For 
example, the literature suggests that in China, once a firm is qualified as a high-tech firm 
by the government, it signals that the firm may receive preferential treatment from the 
government (Wright et al. 2008). One CEO from our field interview recalled how the 
endorsement by a science park owned by the government (Shanghai Zizhu Science-based 
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Industrial Park) helped his firm gain customer’s confidence and consequently resulted in 
continuous sales. Nevertheless, similar endorsement from business partners may not have 
such effect if the partners lack support from government.  
 
As a result, this thesis will mainly focus on PIRs. Moreover, the literature review reveals 
a need to identify different types of PIRs in emerging economies. This need has also been 
confirmed by our filed interviews. Some interviewees have mentioned new types of 
political institutional resources that had not been mentioned by previous literature, such 
as endorsement from science parks, and financial capital from government-founded 
incubation centers. Hence, we will identify different types of PIRs first, and investigate 




CHAPTER 4. A THEORETICAL TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES (STUDY I) 
 
The purpose of chapter 4 is to develop a theoretical typology of PIRs in emerging 
economies, and explore the different effect of each type of PIRs on IT entrepreneurial 
firm performance. 
 
4.1 A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES (PIRS) 
In order to provide a systematic view, we base our typology on the key dimensions of 
PIRs that matter to IT entrepreneurial firms. IT entrepreneurial firms put a strong 
emphasize on innovation (e.g., R&D and technological leadership) and risk taking (e.g., 
high risk projects with chances of high rates) (Miller and Friesen 1982). Consequently, IT 
entrepreneurial firms are usually characterized by two features. First, they often 
experience dramatic changes in strategic objectives, in order to respond to new 
technologic development and fast-changing customer needs (Harris et al. 2009, Miller 
and Friesen 1982, Rose 2010). Second, their entrepreneurial decisions should be efficient 
to prevent competition for the rents associated with a market opportunity from emerging 




According to the two characteristics (i.e., dramatic goal changing, and fast decision-
making speed), we posit that two dimensions of PIRs become pertinent: the kinds of 
government involvement in goal setting (specific and general goals) and the kinds of 
government involvement in resource allocation (tight and loose connections). These two 
dimensions resonate well with the institution-based view that focuses on the interaction 
between political institutions and firms (Peng et al. 2008).  
 
4.1.1 Government Involvement in Goal Setting 
First, the kinds of government involvement in goal setting refer to whether government 
sets specific objectives of firm outcomes before allocating PIRs to firms. Indeed, 
government in emerging economies not only lends PIRs to help the development of 
entrepreneurial firms, but also uses them as effective tools to encourage firms to conduct 
more innovation and entrepreneurship (Cumming 2007, Salamon 2002, Schlevogt 2001). 
On the one hand, government selects promising entrepreneurial firms, supports them, and 
holds them as role models for other firms. On the other hand, government also sets 
associated goals for entrepreneurial firms to accomplish and review firm performance at 
the end (Salamon 2002).  
 
When government sets specific goals for firms, it focuses on particular aspects of firm 
deliveries, e.g., government issued direct grants on R&D (Czarnitzki et al. 2010). In 
contrast, when government sets general goals for firms, its expectation of firm deliveries 
is not limited in a specific range, e.g., government issued direct grants on entrepreneurial 




Differentiating the kinds of government involvement in goal setting is important because 
PIRs with specific / general goals set by government may differ in terms of the 
incongruence of objectives between government and firms. Unlike firms whose objective 
is to maximize economic profits, government aims to serve the welfare of a society, e.g., 
funding risky basic research, or lowering unemployment rate (Kernaghan 2003, Moore 
1995). When lending support to firms, government often sets goals optimal from its own 
point of view, but suboptimal from firms’ (Okhmatovskiy 2010, Shleifer and Vishny 
1998). Moreover, in emerging economies, the goals set by governments are not easy to 
change given the heavily bureaucratic procedures of centralized plan making in 
government agencies (Czarnitzki et al. 2011, Hoskisson et al. 2000, Jong et al. 2010). As 
the institution-based view suggests, entrepreneurial firms rely heavily on government to 
access key resources in emerging economies. With specific goals set by government, IT 
entrepreneurial firms may be unable to respond quickly to technological and market 
opportunities. Instead, they have to comply with government goals at the expense of their 
long-run profitability (Sun et al. 2009, Sun et al. 2010). In contrast, with general goals set 
by government, IT entrepreneurial firms could enjoy a higher autonomy and utilize PIRs 
more efficiently. Overall, IT entrepreneurial firms may find PIRs less efficient with 
specific goals than general goals. 
 
4.1.2 Government Involvement in Resource Allocation 
Second, the kinds of government involvement in resource allocation refer to whether the 
inter-organizational connections between government and firms in resource allocation are 
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tight or loose. When the connections are tight, government is involved deeply in resource 
allocation, e.g., government contracts and sales (Busenitz et al. 2000, Lux et al. 2011). In 
contrast, when the connections are loose, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or institutions 
(SOIs), rather than government, allocate resources, e.g., SOE contracts and sales 
(Okhmatovskiy 2010).   
 
Differentiating the kinds of government involvement in resource allocation is also 
important because PIRs with tight/loose connections to government may differ in terms 
of the amount of interaction with government (Park and Luo 2001). In emerging 
economies, interaction with government is heavily bureaucratic and time-consuming 
(Czarnitzki et al. 2010, Jong et al. 2010). The tighter connections, the more cumbersome 
the interaction is. However, to cultivate innovation, IT entrepreneurial firms usually 
adopt a less bureaucratic communication style. The mismatch between these firms and 
government’s interaction styles may hinder firms from efficiently utilizing PIRs. Hence, 
IT entrepreneurial firms may find PIRs less efficient if the inter-organizational 
connections with government are tight than loose. 
 
Based on the two dimensions above, we categorize PIRs into a 2×2 matrix with four 
cells: directive PIRs, associative PIRs, supportive PIRs, and augmentative PIRs (Figure 
1).  These two dimensions are independent of each other because regardless of the 
connections to the government, the goals can be either specific or general. For example, 
either government or SOEs/SOIs can allocate R&D subsidies (i.e., PIRs with specific 
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goals) to IT entrepreneurial firms. By the same token, either of them can also allocate 
firm development subsidies (i.e., PIRs with general goals) to IT entrepreneurial firms. 
 
Figure 4.1: A 2×2 Matrix of Political Institutional Resources 
 
 
4.1.3 Sources of PIRs 
Moreover, in each cell of Figure 4.1, we further list out sub-types of PIRs according to 
the sources of resources because they may further determine the benefits and costs 
associating with each type of PIRs. Sources of PIRs refer to where PIRs stem from. 
Based on our literature review and filed interviews, firms can get PIRs from four sources: 
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transactions with government (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2010), government’s regulation (Li 
and Atuahene-Gima 2001), government endorsed reputation (Yiu and Lau 2008), and 
political embeddedness (Sun et al. 2010). PIRs from these four sources are labeled as 
transactional PIRs, regulative PIRs, reputational PIRs, and embeddedness PIRs 
respectively (Figure 4.2). While transactional and embeddedness PIRs are manifested in 
bidirectional relationships (i.e., government and firms make reciprocal transactions or 
form support networks), regulative and reputational PIRs are manifested in unidirectional 
relationships (i.e., government regulates firms or gives rewards to firms; firms are only 
recipients). Moreover, each source of PIRs differs in more subtle ways. Transactional 
PIRs are mainly realized by forming formal inter-organizational contracts between 
government and firms (e.g., sales to government) (Busenitz et al. 2000, Lux et al. 2011, 
Okhmatovskiy 2010), while embeddedness PIRs are realized in forming formal 
interpersonal relationships (e.g., when firms hire incumbent or former government 
officials to be board members or executives) (Armanios et al. 2012, Wu et al. 2012). As 
for regulative PIRs, the eligible recipients can be all firms that have some identical 
characteristics (e.g., tax deduction for all firms located in Shenzhen) (Czarnitzki and 
Licht 2006); but for reputational PIRs, the eligible recipients are limited to top firms that 
are relatively stronger than peers (e.g., top 10 in an industry) (Yiu and Lau 2008). These 
various sources would further affect firms’ benefits and costs of receiving PIRs, thereby 











4.1.4 A Typology of PIRs 
Based on the matrix of PIRs and sources of PIRs, we develop a typology of PIRs 









Specific goals set by government General goals set by government 
Tight connections 




Directive Transactional PIRs 
 Government contracts and sales 
 
Directive Regulative PIRs 
 Government direct subsidies / grants on 
specific fields (e.g., government grants 
on R&D, government issued loan on 
R&D, interest subsidy on high-tech 
product export) 
 Government tax subsidies on specific 
fields (e.g., R&D tax deduction) 
 Government regulatory policies that 
offer support on specific fields (e.g., 
license of technology import, patent and 
copyright protection, product export, 
financing support, human resource) 
 
Directive Reputational PIRs 
 Government issued rewards on specific 
fields (e.g., incentives for being top-10 
R&D enterprise in a city) 
 Government issued credentials, 
certificates and awards on specific fields 
(e.g., award of top-10 R&D enterprise in 
a city) 
 
Directive Embeddedness PIRs 
 Political embeddedness such as board 
member / top manager being former or 
incumbent manager in government with 
specific function 
Associative PIRs 
Associative Transactional PIRs 
 Financial investment by state (e.g., state-
owned shares) 
 
Associative Regulative PIRs 
 Government direct subsidies / grants on 
general fields (e.g., government grants on 
new firms, government issued loan on new 
firms, regional interest subsidy) 
 Government tax subsidies on general 
fields (e.g., regional tax deduction) 
 Government regulatory policies that offer 
support on general fields (e.g., industry 
development, regional development) 
 
Associative Reputational PIRs 
 Government issued rewards on general 
fields (e.g., incentives for being top-10 
high-growth enterprise in a city) 
 Government issued credentials, certificates 
and awards on general fields (e.g., award 
of top-10 high-growth enterprise in a city) 
 
Associative Embeddedness PIRs 
 Political embeddedness such as board 
member / top manager being former or 








Supportive Transactional PIRs 
 Sales to state-owned 
enterprise/institution 
 
Supportive Regulative PIRs 
 State-owned enterprise/institution issued 
direct subsidies / grants on specific 
fields (e.g., science park issued R&D 
subsidies) 
 State-owned enterprise/institution issued 
regulations that offer support on specific 
fields (e.g., R&D regulations) 
 
Supportive Reputational PIRs 
 State-owned enterprise/institution issued 
rewards on specific fields (e.g., 
incentives for being top-10 R&D 
enterprise in a science park) 
 State-owned enterprise/institution issued 
credentials, certificates and awards on 
specific fields (e.g., award of top-10 
R&D enterprise in a science park) 
 
Supportive Embeddedness PIRs 
 Political embeddedness such as board 
member / top manager being former or 
incumbent manager in state-owned 
enterprise/institution with specific 
function 
Augmentative PIRs 
Augmentative Transactional PIRs 
 Financial investment by state-owned 
enterprise/institution (e.g., state-owned 
legal person shares) 
 
Augmentative Regulative PIRs 
 State-owned enterprise/institution issued 
direct subsidies / grants on general fields 
(e.g., science park issued subsidies) 
 State-owned enterprise/institution issued 
regulations that offer support on general 
fields (e.g., new firm regulations) 
 
Augmentative Reputational PIRs 
 State-owned enterprise/institution issued 
rewards on general fields (e.g., incentives 
for being top-10 high-growth enterprise in 
a science park) 
 State-owned enterprise/institution issued 
credentials, certificates and awards on 
general fields (e.g., award of top-10 high-
growth enterprise in a science park) 
 
Augmentative Embeddedness PIRs 
 Political embeddedness such as board 
member / top manager being former or 
incumbent manager in state-owned 
enterprise/institution with general function
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4.2 PROPOSITIONS ON POLITICAL INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES 
4.2.1 Directive PIRs 
Directive PIRs refer to political institutional resources with specific goals set by 
government and tight connections to government in resource allocation. Generally 
speaking, directive PIRs can boost IT entrepreneurial firm performance by helping firms 
overcome insurmountable handicap of resource deficiency, especially in emerging 
economies where government exerts macro-control and allocates resources unfairly (Li 
and Atuahene-Gima 2001). The dark side of directive PIRs is that they would impose 
large incongruence of objectives and heavy interaction with government. The large 
incongruence of objectives would result in restrictions on firms’ autonomy and harm firm 
performance. The heavy interaction with government would further impact firms’ agility 
to respond to opportunities. Since transactional / regulative / reputational / embeddedness 
PIRs further denote different levels of benefits and costs, we give separate propositions 
on each of them below. 
 
Directive Transactional PIRs. In particular, directive transactional PIRs imply that 
firms have transactional relationships with government, which serves as a stabilizer for 
the sales of IT entrepreneurial firms.  For example, Lux et al. (2011) suggests that one 
major benefit of firms to get into cooperate political actions is sizeable government sales. 
 
However, firms with directive transactional PIRs are vulnerable to great intervention 
from government in terms of both goal setting and resource allocation. When directive 
transactional PIRs are low, the relatively small amount of government sales and 
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interaction costs with government would not constrain the flexibility and development of 
IT entrepreneurial firms. When directive transactional PIRs keep growing and exceed 
some point, their constraints on firms cannot be neglected anymore. For example, in our 
interview, a CEO said that although he has made revenues from long term contracts with 
government, his firm has small bargaining power in terms of product/service 
specifications and contract fulfillment. This limited the flexibility of his firm’s strategy. 
Moreover, to enlarge the amount of government sales or even maintain the current 
amount, he has to spend increasing time and efforts to interact with government officials. 
According to Jong et al. (2010), entrepreneurs are easily trapped into vicious circles of 
ever-increasing bribes that absorb resources and limit revenues. The costs arising from 
the constraints could offset the benefits of directive transactional PIRs. Finally, as 
directive transactional PIRs go to high levels, their negative impact will cancel out the 
benefits, resulting in a negative effect on firm performance. This line of argument implies 
that directive transactional PIRs have an inverted U-shape effect on firm performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 1(a): Directive transactional PIRs will have an inverted U-shape effect (⋂) 
on IT entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
Directive Regulative PIRs. As for directive regulative PIRs, they not only help IT 
entrepreneurial firms better navigate the uncertain waters of policy (Peng and Luo 2000), 
but also signal reputation and quality which help IT entrepreneurial firms gain legitimacy 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). For example, Li and Atuahene-Gima (2001) found that 
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product innovation strategy is more effective when firms get support in terms of 
favorable policies such as licenses for imports of technology.  
 
However, firms with directive regulative PIRs are vulnerable to great intervention from 
government in terms of both goal setting and resource allocation. For example, 
government often uses R&D subsidies to encourage entrepreneurial firms to input more 
on R&D (Lerner 1999, Wallsten 2000). Salamon (2002) documented that these firms are 
required to expend a particular amount of money per year on some projects. They need to 
retain quarterly and final financial reports, as well as programmatic progress reports, 
several years after the review’s conclusion, to ensure that they are meeting government’s 
goals (Salamon 2002). This could confine firms with regard to strategy pivoting, 
especially for entrepreneurial firms who are short of slack resources. Besides constraining 
firm strategy, directive regulative PIRs also entail heavy interaction costs in dealing with 
corrupt bureaucrats (Gohmann 2010). As deciding and allocating directive regulative 
PIRs in emerging economies are often not transparent to the public, government has large 
latitude, thereby resulting in room for rent-seeking and bribery (Czarnitzki et al. 2011, 
Hoskisson et al. 2000, Jong et al. 2010). 
 
By the same token, when directive regulative PIRs are low, the relatively small amount of 
inputs and interaction costs would not constrain the flexibility and development of IT 
entrepreneurial firms. When directive transactional PIRs exceed some point, their 
constraints on firms are accumulated to a certain level that cannot be neglected. Finally, 
as directive regulative PIRs go to high levels, the constraints will result in significant 
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negative impacts that overweigh the benefits, thereby resulting in a negative effect on 
firm performance. This line of argument implies that directive regulative PIRs have an 
inverted U-shape effect on firm performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 1(b): Directive regulative PIRs will have an inverted U-shape effect (⋂) on IT 
entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
Directive Reputational PIRs. Directive reputational PIRs mainly signal superior 
specific quality of entrepreneurial firms evaluated by government. For example, receiving 
technology-related awards from government is a recognition that leads to intangible 
reputation legitimacy in that field (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2010). Moreover, directive 
reputational PIRs will also reinforce firms’ pursuit of product innovations, and enhance 
firm performance and strategic competitiveness (Yiu and Lau 2008). 
 
Moreover, the negative effects of directive reputational PIRs are not salient. This is 
because governments in emerging economies usually propagate promising firms as role 
models. Due to the public visibility of role models, government is inclined to select firms 
based on firm quality, and adjusts goals to better maintain the growth of role models. 
This reduces the incongruence of objectives and interaction with government to moderate 
levels, implying a positive effect of directive reputational PIRs. For example, one CEO in 
our interview spoke of her firm’s experience of winning a reward by Shanghai 
government in a technology competition. Her firm had no prior tie with government 
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officials, neither did they have heavy interaction with government. In addition, although 
the Shanghai government did have specific expectations on her firm, she felt not being 
constrained greatly by it. By and large, the public visibility of role models will dampen 
the negative effects deriving from incongruence of objectives and heavy interaction with 
government, thereby remaining a positive effect of directive reputational PIRs. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 1(c): Directive reputational PIRs will have a positive effect (/) on IT 
entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
Directive Embeddedness PIRs. Directive embeddedness PIRs provide valuable non-
business perspectives on knowledge of specific public policies and access to key related 
decision makers in government. For example, Lester et al. (2008) found that firms’ 
decision to invite a former government official to sit on the board is influenced by the 
official’s policy expertise in related areas.  
 
However, firms with directive embeddedness PIRs are confined by government’s 
intervention in goal setting and resource allocation. Directive embeddedness PIRs bring 
in government officials or politicians whose personal or political agendas are contrary to 
firm value maximization, thereby hurting firm performance (Wu et al. 2012). By 
assigning directive embeddedness PIRs to firms, government may also set specific 
requirement for firms to accomplish, e.g., specific public or quasi-public services 
(Maskin and Tirole 2008, Zhang et al. 2009). Moreover,  government officials or 
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politicians are often used to a bureaucratic tradition of formal structure and procedures in 
their operating routines, which impairs the inefficiency of firm governance (Zhang and 
Keh 2010). Firms may even encounter problems in managerial autonomy caused by 
government intervention due to directive embeddedness PIRs (Lioukas et al. 1993, Peng 
and Luo 2000). All these constraints compose the costs of directive embeddedness PIRs.  
 
When directive embeddedness PIRs are low, these costs will not exert a salient effect. 
However, when directive embeddedness PIRs exceed some point and keep going to high 
levels, these costs will be escalated dramatically and overweigh the benefits of directive 
embeddedness PIRs. This line of argument implies that directive embeddedness PIRs 
have an inverted U-shape effect on firm performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 1(d): Directive embeddedness PIRs will have an inverted U-shape effect (⋂) 
on IT entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
4.2.2 Associative PIRs 
Associative PIRs are political institutional resources with general goals set by 
government and tight connections to government in resource allocation. Generally 
speaking, associative PIRs boost IT entrepreneurial firm performance by facilitating 
access to valuable resources controlled by government. On the other hand, associative 
PIRs generally impose heavy interaction with government but little incongruence of 
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objectives. We give separate propositions on transactional / regulative / reputational / 
embeddedness PIRs below. 
 
Associative Transactional PIRs. In particular, as associative transactional PIRs focus on 
general firm performance, they are mainly manifested in financial investment by state, 
e.g., state-owned shares (Qiang 2003). It is worth noting that firms with state-owned 
shares are not necessarily SOEs, depending on whether the controlling shareholder is the 
state. Like directive transactional PIRs, associative transactional PIRs indicate a stable 
transactional relationship between firms and government, and could largely benefit firm 
performance.  
 
However, firms with associative transactional PIRs are vulnerable to heavy interaction 
with government. When associative transactional PIRs are low, the relatively small 
amount of state-owned shares would not impose heavy interaction with government. 
When associative transactional PIRs exceed some point, the interaction between 
government and firms will be increased greatly and negatively affect managerial 
efficiency (Zhang and Keh 2010). Finally, when associative transactional PIRs become 
high, the interaction costs will overweigh the benefits of associative transactional PIRs. 
This line of argument implies that associative transactional PIRs have an inverted U-
shape effect on firm performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
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Proposition 2(a): Associative transactional PIRs will have an inverted U-shaped effect (⋂) 
on IT entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
Associative Regulative PIRs. Associative regulative PIRs help IT entrepreneurial firms 
utilize favorable policies and programs issued by government, and signal IT 
entrepreneurial firms’ capability to gain these PIRs as well (Luo 2003). For example, 
Busenitz et al. (2000) highlighted the importance of general policy that favors 
entrepreneurship.   
 
Unlike directive regulative PIRs, associative regulative PIRs do not imply heavy 
interaction with government because the allocation of associative regulative PIRs is more 
transparent than directive regulative PIRs. For example, all high-tech firms located in 
some city could enjoy regional tax deduction. Thus, government officials, although they 
might conduct rent-seeking, are not able to override the publicly visible justice. In other 
words, the interaction with government will be more efficient and less cumbersome. 
Hence, we expect a positive effect of associative regulative PIRs on firm performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 2(b): Associative regulative PIRs will have a positive effect (/) on IT 
entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
Associative Reputational PIRs. Associative reputational PIRs signal the potential of 
entrepreneurial firms, and help firm acquire legitimacy. For example, receiving 
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entrepreneurship awards from government not only leads to intangible reputation and 
organizational legitimacy, but also reinforces firms’ pursuit of entrepreneurial activities 
(Ahlstrom and Bruton 2010, Yiu and Lau 2008).  
 
Moreover, like directive reputational PIRs, heavy interaction is not a concern for 
associative reputational PIRs due to the public visibility of role models. As explained 
earlier, government is more likely to facilitate these role models to have better 
performance, in order to reinforce its own performance in the eyes of public.  Moreover, 
after getting associative reputational PIRs from one department of government, firms are 
better equipped with legitimacy to interact with other departments of government, 
thereby reducing the total interaction costs. By and large, associative reputational PIRs 
will have a positive effect on firm performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 2(c): Associative reputational PIRs will have a positive effect (/) on IT 
entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
Associative Embeddedness PIRs. Associative embeddedness PIRs not only provide 
access to inside information of general public policies, but also improve firms’ political 
legitimacy (Sheng et al. 2011). For example, Peng and Luo (2000) found that firms with 




However, firms with associative embeddedness PIRs are also influenced by heavy 
interaction with government. As explained before, government officials or politicians 
might bring their bureaucratic tradition of formal structure and procedures to their firms’ 
operating routines, yielding a negative effect on managerial inefficiency (Zhang and Keh 
2010). Moreover, the inclusion of government officials or politicians entails arbitrary 
intervention from government, which remains a constant danger to many firms with 
associative embeddedness PIRs (Peng and Luo 2000).  
 
When associative embeddedness PIRs are low, these costs are not salient yet. But the 
amount of interaction with government will be escalated as associative embeddedness 
PIRs increase. When these PIRs exceed some point, their benefits will be counteracted to 
zero. Finally, as these PIRs increase to high levels, the costs of them will outweigh the 
benefits and turn the total profits turn negative. Hence, we expect an inverted U-shape 
effect of associative embeddedness PIRs on firm performance.  
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 2(d): Associative embeddedness PIRs will have an inverted U-shaped effect 
(⋂) on IT entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
4.2.3 Supportive PIRs 
Supportive PIRs refer to political institutional resources with specific goals set by 
government and loose connections to government in resource allocation. On the one hand, 
supportive PIRs improve IT entrepreneurial firm performance by facilitating access to 
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valuable resources that government has placed under the management of SOEs/SOIs 
(Okhmatovskiy 2010), such as technology developed by state-owned research institutes 
(Yiu and Lau 2008). Nevertheless, because SOEs/SOIs also face systematic risks in the 
weak institutional environment, the resources derived from them – supportive PIRs may 
generate less significant benefits than directive PIRs (Armanios et al. 2012).  
 
On the other hand, supportive PIRs are supposed to impose large incongruence of 
objectives but light interaction with government. Nevertheless, since managers of 
SOEs/SOIs are much more business-minded than government officials (Liu and Sun 
2005), they tend to proactively adjust the objectives of resources and reduce the 
incongruence of objectives between IT entrepreneurial firms and government to moderate 
levels. In particular, separate propositions on transactional / regulative / reputational / 
embeddedness PIRs are given below. 
 
Supportive Transactional PIRs. In particular, supportive transactional PIRs imply that 
firms get payoffs in the form of having specific transactions with SOEs/SOIs. For 
example, regular sales to SOEs/SOIs can stabilize entrepreneurial firms’ cash flow and 
help these firms against the risk of demand turbulence. However, as mentioned above, 
because SOEs/SOIs may also have difficulty in sustaining their own performance, 
supportive transactional PIRs are thus not so helpful to entrepreneurial firms. When 
supportive transactional PIRs are low, their benefits may not be powerful enough to 
influence the performance of entrepreneurial firms. Only when supportive transactional 




On the contrary, although business-minded managers of SOEs/SOIs may proactively 
reduce incongruence of objectives between IT entrepreneurial firms and government, 
their motivation to do so depends greatly on the amount of supportive transactional PIRs. 
When the amount of sales to SOEs/SOIs is small, SOEs/SOIs are less motivated to adjust 
the goals of transactions to facilitate the sustainability of entrepreneurial firms, remaining 
larger incongruence of objectives between IT entrepreneurial firms and government. 
Nevertheless, when the amount of sales to SOEs/SOIs increases to high levels, 
SOEs/SOIs will be highly motivated to adjust their goals of transactions to fit 
entrepreneurial firms’, in order to stabilize their own procurement.  
 
By and large, when supportive transactional PIRs are low, the constraints outperform the 
benefits, resulting in a negative effect. As supportive transactional PIRs increase, the 
constraints will keep dropping, while the benefits will keep increasing. When supportive 
transactional PIRs exceed some point and keep growing to high levels, the benefits will 
outweigh the constraints, thereby turning the total effect into positive. This line of 
argument implies that supportive transactional PIRs have a U-shape effect on firm 
performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 3(a): Supportive transactional PIRs will have a U-shaped effect (U) on IT 




Supportive Regulative PIRs. As for supportive regulative PIRs, they not only signal IT 
entrepreneurial firms’ ability in specific fields, but also reinforce these firms’ potential. 
For example, Yiu and Lau (2008) suggest that engaging in R&D and technology 
exchange programs with universities and research institutes in China may lead to tangible 
outcomes like patents, and intangible ones like reputations and recognitions.  
 
By the same token, when supportive regulative PIRs are at their low levels (e.g., a small 
amount of science park issued R&D subsidies), the benefits of them are not salient. In 
contrast, the constraints derived from the incongruence of objectives between firms and 
SOEs/SOIs are not likely to be reduced yet (e.g., the goals set by the science park might 
be more political-oriented than firms). Together it yields a negative effect on firm 
performance. However, as supportive regulative PIRs increase, the benefits will keep 
growing (e.g., a larger amount of R&D subsidies contributes to the firm’s technological 
capability), whereas the constraints will keep decreasing (e.g., mangers of the science 
park are now strongly motivated to adjust their requirement on the firm that has got 
subsidies, in order to realize payoffs from the large amount of subsidies). After 
supportive regulative PIRs exceed some point, the benefits will outperform the 
constraints and result in a positive effect on firm performance. This line of argument 
implies that supportive regulative PIRs have a U-shape effect on firm performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 3(b): Supportive regulative PIRs will have a U-shaped effect (U) on IT 




Supportive Reputational PIRs. Exceptionally, as for supportive reputational PIRs, the 
credentials and rewards issued by SOEs/SOIs may be fairly easy to get, and thus do not 
have so significant benefits. According to Zhang and Keh (2010), in 2004, there were 
approximately 192,000 SOEs in China. It is a common strategy to get reputational 
support from SOEs/SOIs when firms are not able to get it directly from government 
(Armanios et al. 2012). Given the popularity of supportive reputational PIRs, they could 
not constitute entrepreneurial firms’ asset for growth (Barney 1991). Moreover, the 
negative effects of directive reputational PIRs are not significant as well. This is because 
the SOEs/SOIs are less likely to risk their reputation and are thus inclined to relax the 
incongruence of objectives to facilitate the growth of their endorsed firms. By and large, 
due to the trivial advantages and disadvantages of supportive reputational PIRs, they are 
expected to have no effects. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 3(c): Supportive reputational PIRs will not affect IT entrepreneurial firm 
performance. 
 
Supportive Embeddedness PIRs. Supportive embeddedness PIRs are mainly 
manifested in hiring former or incumbent managers in SOEs/SOIs who have speciality. 
Because managers from SOEs/SOIs are well immersed in both the political and business 
environments, they are ambidextrous in terms of dealing with political and business 
issues. These managers from SOEs/SOIs can help firms plug into political networks, get 
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political legitimacy, and sharpen firms’ understanding of the external political 
requirement. All of these will result in positive effect on firm performance. Moreover, 
regardless of the number of managers from SOEs/SOIs, they all will proactively adjust 
the objectives of resources. In other words, the negative effects of supportive 
embeddedness PIRs are not salient. Hence, we expect a positive effect of supportive 
embeddedness PIRs on firm performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 3(d): Supportive embeddedness PIRs will have a positive effect (/) on IT 
entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
4.2.4 Augmentative PIRs 
Augmentative PIRs are political institutional resources with general goals set by 
government and loose connections to government in resource allocation. Generally 
speaking, augmentative PIRs boost IT entrepreneurial firm performance by facilitating 
access to valuable resources under the management of SOEs/SOIs. On the other hand, all 
augmentative PIRs are supposed to impose little incongruence of objectives and light 
interaction with government. In particular, separate propositions on transactional / 
regulative / reputational / embeddedness PIRs are given below. 
 
Augmentative Transactional PIRs. As augmentative transactional PIRs focus on 
general firm performance, they are mainly manifested in financial investment by 
SOEs/SOIs, e.g., state-owned legal person shares. Like associative transactional PIRs, 
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augmentative transactional PIRs imply that firms have a positive evaluation by 
SOEs/SOIs, which could improve firms’ legitimacy and performance.  
 
Moreover, augmentative transactional PIRs do not impose large incongruence of 
objectives and heavy interaction with government on firms. First, incongruence of 
objectives are not a major concern for augmentative transactional PIRs, not only because 
with general goals, firms have more freedom to adjust their objectives, but also because 
managers of SOEs/SOIs are more inclined to proactively reduce the incongruence of 
objectives (Liu and Sun 2005). Second, firms do not have heavy interaction with 
government. Indeed, firms mostly interact with managers of SOEs/SOIs who are less 
bureaucratic than government officials, thereby saving interaction time and costs. By and 
large, with some benefits but little costs, augmentative transactional PIRs are expected to 
have a positive effect on firm performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 4(a): Augmentative transactional PIRs will have a positive effect (/) on IT 
entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
Augmentative Regulative PIRs. As for augmentative regulative PIRs, they not only 
signal IT entrepreneurial firms’ ability as a whole, but also bring legitimacy to IT 
entrepreneurial firms. For example, by having subsidies from science parks, IT 
entrepreneurial firms show their ability to capture opportunities embedded in the 




By the same token, large incongruence of objectives and heavy interaction with 
government are not issues for augmentative regulative PIRs. Take small firm 
development subsidies issued by science parks as an example. First, by issuing the 
subsidies, a science park is aimed to encourage firms located in this science park to grow 
quickly, which is in line with firms’ own goals. Second, the interaction with SOEs/SOIs 
is not cumbersome, saving interaction costs for firms. Hence, we expect augmentative 
regulative PIRs to have a positive effect on firm performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 4(b): Augmentative regulative PIRs will have a positive effect (/) on IT 
entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
Augmentative Reputational PIRs. Exceptionally, the effects of augmentative 
reputational PIRs are not expected to be salient. On the one hand, as explained earlier, 
reputational PIRs issued by SOEs/SOIs are not difficult to imitate and thus do not speak 
to firm performance (Armanios et al. 2012, Barney 1991). On the other hand, the 
negative effects of augmentative reputational PIRs are not significant because the 
SOEs/SOIs also weigh much their own reputation and are thus more supportive of the 
firms endorsed by them. By and large, due to the trivial advantages and disadvantages of 
augmentative reputational PIRs, they are expected to have no effects. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
93 
 
Proposition 4(c): Augmentative reputational PIRs will not affect IT entrepreneurial firm 
performance. 
 
Augmentative Embeddedness PIRs. Augmentative embeddedness PIRs are mainly 
manifested in having former or incumbent managers in SOEs/SOIs who have generic 
experiences of management to join entrepreneurial firms. Like supportive embeddedness 
PIRs, their ambidexterity is beneficial to entrepreneurial firms. Moreover, these managers 
from SOEs/SOIs can help firms enlarge connections with political networks and better 
acquire resources for future growth. Moreover, like supportive embeddedness PIRs, 
augmentative embeddedness PIRs do not results in salient negative effects. Hence, we 
expect a positive effect of augmentative embeddedness PIRs on firm performance. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 4(d): Augmentative embeddedness PIRs will have a positive effect (/) on IT 
entrepreneurial firm performance. 
 
Propositions 1(a,b,c,d) – 4 (a,b,c,d) are summarized in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2: Propositions of Political Institutional Resources (PIRs) 
PIRs Benefits Incongruence of Objectives 




Effects of PIRs on IT 
Entrepreneurial Firm 
Performance 
Directive transactional PIRs Large Large Heavy Inverted U-shaped 
Directive regulative PIRs Large Large Heavy Inverted U-shaped 
Directive reputational PIRs Large Moderate Moderate Positive 
Directive embeddedness PIRs Large Large Heavy Inverted U-shaped 
Associative transactional PIRs Large Small Heavy Inverted U-shaped 
Associative regulative PIRs Large Small Moderate Positive 
Associative reputational PIRs Large Small Moderate Positive 
Associative embeddedness PIRs Large Small Heavy Inverted U-shaped 
Supportive transactional PIRs Large Moderate Little U-shaped  
Supportive regulative PIRs Large Moderate Little U-shaped  
Supportive reputational PIRs Small Small Little No effect 
Supportive embeddedness PIRs Large Small Little Positive 
Augmentative transactional PIRs Large Small Little Positive 
Augmentative regulative PIRs Large Small Little Positive 
Augmentative reputational PIRs Small Small Little No effect 
Augmentative embeddedness PIRs Large Small Little Positive 
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4.3 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
4.3.1 Theoretical Contributions 
This theoretical study has important theoretical contributions. First, it contributes to the 
institution-based view by developing a typology of PIRs according to the characteristics 
of IT entrepreneurial firms in emerging economies. Prior work on PIRs has generally not 
systematically distinguished among PIRs with different benefits and costs and are thus at 
risk of aggregation bias. A key contribution of our study is systematically introducing 
two important dimensions of PIRs – government involvement in goal setting, and 
government involvement in resource allocation. Together, they define four types of PIRs: 
directive, associative, supportive, and augmentative. It enriches the growing research in 
IT entrepreneurship strategy by providing a theoretical basis for future research on PIRs. 
 
Second, by elaborating the different effects of various PIRs on IT entrepreneurial firm 
performance, this theoretical study complements the extant literature that mainly suggests 
a positive effect of PIRs. More specifically, we explain the benefits and costs of each 
type of PIRs and form hypotheses about their distinct effects on IT entrepreneurial firm 
performance. Thus, we extend the generic concept of PIRs into a more fine-grained 
framework, and provide a more subtle understanding of PIRs.  
 
Third, it lays a good foundation to develop a contextualized theory in emerging 
economies. Contextualization refers to adding one more level to theorization by 
accounting for the effect of contextual characteristics on the behavior of and within 
organizations (Tsui 2007). The scholarship has realized the importance to develop 
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contextualized theory, e.g., Chinese theory of management (Barney and Zhang 2009). As 
Whetten (2009) pointed out, the pervasive practice of borrowing the Western theoretical 
perspectives should be curtailed in favor of producing indigenous alternatives. In the 
same token, Tsui (2007, p.1357) cautioned that “to the extent that countries differ in their 
political, economic, social, and cultural institutions from those typical in the context in 
which most current management models and theories were developed, replication or 
application of these theories may lead to biased or inaccurate conclusions”.  The current 
study not only raises novel questions in new contexts (i.e., the role of PIRs in emerging 
economies), but also yields an innovative theory that fits the new contexts and answers 
the emerging managerial and strategic questions. By addressing indigenous problems, it 
also informs and improves the strategy and management theory in general. 
 
4.3.2 Practical Contributions 
This study also provides valuable knowledge to IT entrepreneurs as well as governments 
in emerging economies. On the one hand, it provides insights to IT entrepreneurial firms 
that are applying PIRs but do not have complete knowledge of how to maximize their 
usage of PIRs yet. IT entrepreneurial firms have limited access to resources. Therefore, 
PIRs, as a significant portion of external resources, become very critical to them. If firms 
are able to fully utilize these PIRs to the greatest potential, they are capable of achieving 
superior performance and outperform others in the extremely competitive environment. 
This study offers insights on how to fully utilize PIRs, and helps firms better understand 
the complex effects of PIRs. 
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On the other hand, this study informs governments that have issued significant amount of 
PIRs on IT entrepreneurial firms but have not seen clear effects yet. It suggests that some 
types of PIRs may increase firm performance, whereas other types of PIRs may hurt firm 
performance. Based on this study, governments could refine the design of PIRs, increase 
the effectiveness of PIR utilization, and accelerate the pace of economical development 
of their country and society.  
 
4.3.2 Future Research 
This theoretical study of PIR typology could be used in several ways. Given that it is 
ambitious to compare all types of PIRs in one piece of empirical work, one sensible 
approach is to choose a small set of different PIRs and empirically compare their effects. 
For example, future research could focus on PIRs that have tight connects to government 
in resource allocation, and use another dimension – government involvement in goal 
setting – to compare how directive PIRs associative PIRs yield different effects on firm 
performance. A more concrete example reflecting this idea will be presented in the 
following chapter. Alternatively, future research could also conduct comparisons by 
considering the first two dimensions simultaneously, e.g., examining the difference 
between directive PIRs, associative PIRs, supportive PIRs, and augmentative PIRs.  
 
Another promising avenue for empirical research could be to examine the interaction 
between different PIRs. It is possible that some PIRs, with the presence of other PIRs, 
will exert a stronger effect than without the presence of them. It is also likely to be the 
opposite side of the story: Two types of PIRs may substitute each other. It is thus very 
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interesting to unveil the different patterns of interactions between PIRs. However, as the 
scope of this research stream is too large, we do not conduct empirical studies in this 
thesis, and keep it for future work. 
 
A third future direction could be exploring how different PIRs influence each other. For 
example, Armanios et al. (2012) suggest that entrepreneurial firms navigate the uncertain 
water in emerging economies by employing a two-step strategy: In the first step, 
entrepreneurs’ ties with government officials or SOE/SOI managers  (i.e., embeddedness 
PIRs) facilitate the acquisition of resources such as policy & program, information, 
technical, financial and licensing support (i.e., regulative PIRs). In the second step, these 
resources (i.e., regulative PIRs) speak to venture growth. Our typology of PIRs lays down 
a theoretical basis to examine the interplay between PIRs. The endeavor on this direction 
will not only contribute to entrepreneurship strategy in emerging economies (Bruton et al. 
2009, Tolbert et al. 2011), but also enrich the literature on corporate political strategies in 
general (Hillman et al. 1999).  
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CHAPTER 5. THE PARADOX OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 
(STUDY II) 
 
This chapter presents an empirical study that tests a particular part of propositions raised 
in Chapter 4. Regulative PIRs – formal institutional support from government to firms in 
the form of regulation – are chosen as the foci of PIRs here because government in 
emerging economies is used to utilize regulation to support emerging industries, such as 
IT industry. Moreover, in emerging economies, regulative PIRs for IT entrepreneurial 
firms are often manifested in government-subsidized programs on IT innovation and 
entrepreneurship (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2010). For example, in China, such programs 
include the National Natural Science Foundation (NSFC), the Innovation Fund for Small 
Technology-Based Firms (InnoFund), and the Knowledge Innovation Program (OECD 
2008). The government subsidies have funded over half of the total expenditure on high-
technology R&D in China (The National Bureau of Statistics of China 2009), as Figure 
A.1 in Appendix A shows. Similarly, over 60% of high-technology R&D expenditure in 
Russia comes from government-subsidized programs such as International Science 
Foundation (ISF) program (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2010, OECD 2011). However, the 
effects of these government subsidies remain unclear (OECD 2008). Hence, the purpose 
of Chapter 5 is to investigate how government subsidies affect entrepreneurial firms’ 
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success of initial public offering (IPO) in emerging economies, while using the 
theoretical framework in Chapter 4.  
 
In this chapter, we compare the distinct effects of two types of government subsidies: 
directive subsidy vs. associative subsidy. Moreover, we examine how these effects are 
moderated by two kinds of institutional ties, i.e., institutional bonding tie and institutional 
bridging tie. In particular, we propose that directive subsidy a firm gets before IPO has an 
inverted U-shape effect on the firm’s IPO success; this effect is stronger for firms without 
institutional bonding tie, but weaker for firms without institutional bridging tie. 
Associative subsidy has a positive effect on IPO success; this effect is stronger for firms 
with institutional bonding tie, but weaker for firms with institutional bridging tie. Results 
from 106 IT entrepreneurial firms in China confirmed our hypotheses. Theoretical and 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
IT Entrepreneurial firms often seek to overcome resource deficiency and accelerate their 
growth via initial public offering (IPO) (Stuart et al. 1999). IPO success connotes a 
performance milestone for IT entrepreneurial firms not only because there is a long lag 
before conventional financial indices accurately measure the performance of these firms 
(Chang 2004), but also because IPO indicates these firms’ ability to acquire external 
resources necessary for further growth (Shane and Stuart 2002). Convincing outside 
investors to fund is not easy, as entrepreneurial firms encounter many obstacles and have 
limited track records by which outside investors can evaluate their potential (Higgins and 
Gulati 2006, Junkunc and Eckhardt 2009). Evidence shows that having support from 
prominent actors such as other prestigious firms can signal an issuing firm’s status and 
positively affect its IPO success (Gulati and Higgins 2003, Stuart et al. 1999). Despite 
this evidence, there is less understanding of having support from government – the 
prominent actor in emerging economies. 
 
Having support from government is particularly important in emerging economies 
because government still acts as the major rule maker in these countries (Hoskisson et al. 
2000). In emerging economies, the lack of a well-defined property rights-based legal 
framework, together with significant institutional changes (Peng and Zhou 2005), 
threaten entrepreneurial firms’ survival and growth (Park and Luo 2001). An 
entrepreneurial firm’s capability to cope with weak institutions is one critical aspect of 
firm potential but is invisible to outside investors. As government is the major force in 
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defining and mobilizing resources (Ring et al. 2005), many firms are found to use 
regulative PIRs as evidence to convince outside investors to invest in them. For example, 
reporting government subsidies in IPO prospectus is a common practice for firms in 
China to indicate their capability to cope with weak institutions. However, little is known 
about the effect of government subsidies on entrepreneurial firms’ IPO success in 
emerging economies.  
 
Acknowledging this critical gap, this study examines two types of government subsidies 
in emerging economies (i.e., directive subsidy vs. associative subsidy) that signal 
different capabilities of entrepreneurial firms. Directive subsidy – the government 
subsidy on specific aspects of firm deliveries (e.g., R&D outputs) – endorses firms’ 
capabilities in the specific fields. Associative subsidy – the government subsidy on 
general firm performance (e.g., firm growth) – implies firms’ capability to maintain good 
relationships with government officials and obtain preferential treatment. By carrying 
different signals, these two types of government subsidies should have distinct effects on 
firm IPO success. Moreover, government subsidies are embedded in institutional contexts 
and may not have the same value for all entrepreneurial firms. According to resource 
dependence theory, institutional ties between a firm and government entail the 
interdependence relationships between the firm and government, and modify the effect of 
government subsidies. Therefore, this study will address two research questions:  
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(1) How do directive subsidy and associative subsidy affect entrepreneurial firms’ IPO 
success in emerging economies?  
 
(2) How do institutional ties between government and entrepreneurial firms moderate the 
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5.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In recent years, a burgeoning literature has suggested the significance of having support 
from prominent actors. As the signaling theory suggests (Leland and Pyle 1977, Podolny 
1994, Spence 1974), one major benefit of having support from well-established 
organizations is to mitigate uncertainty in the eyes of outside investors by signaling the 
status of a new venture. Unlike well-established firms, entrepreneurial firms have short 
track records of profit and operations. Moreover, they are often associated with little 
production experience, immature organizational routines, uncertain consumer demand, 
and unstable relationships with suppliers (Stuart et al. 1999, Swinney et al. 2011). All 
these result in considerable uncertainty about their potential. Support from prominent 
actors can either show their reciprocal relationships with an entrepreneurial firm, or 
endorse the capabilities and reliabilities of an entrepreneurial firm (Stuart et al. 1999). 
Additionally, the support can further help an entrepreneurial firm gain access to other 
valuable resources to overcome liabilities of newness (Gulati and Higgins 2003). In this 
paper, we extend this central idea – support from prominent actors mitigates uncertainty – 
to examine the signaling effect of government subsidies but with caution to the context of 
emerging economies. 
 
5.2.1 Government Subsidy 
According to the institution-based view (Oliver 1997, Peng et al. 2008, Ring et al. 2005), 
one predominant uncertainty in emerging economies is that of the weak institutional 
environment (Park and Luo 2001, Peng 2003, Xin and Pearce 1996). Entrepreneurial 
firms not only have to resolve uncertainty around their own success potential, but also 
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navigate the environmental uncertainty an economic transition presents (Armanios et al. 
2012). As government is the most powerful actor and a major source of institutional 
changes in emerging economies (Hoskisson et al. 2000, Ring et al. 2005), seeking 
regulative support from government such as government subsidy becomes a common 
practice for entrepreneurial firms.  
 
Government in emerging economies not only lends government subsidies to help the 
development of entrepreneurial firms, but also uses government subsidies as effective 
policy tool to regulate the market and encourage all firms to conduct innovation and 
entrepreneurship (Cumming 2007, Salamon 2002, Schlevogt 2001). On the one hand, 
government selects promising entrepreneurial firms, supports them, and holds them as 
role models for other firms. Correspondingly, gaining government subsidies signals that 
the entrepreneurial firms have earned a positive evaluation by government. With such 
support, entrepreneurial firms can enlarge their access to information and resources, and 
thus navigate the uncertain waters better. Given high regulative uncertainty in emerging 
economies, government subsidies serve as a stabilizer for these entrepreneurial firms. 
 
On the other hand, during the period of government subsidies, government also sets 
associated goals for entrepreneurial firms to accomplish and review firm performance at 
the end (Salamon 2002). For example, government often use its R&D subsidies as a lever 
to increase firms’ R&D expenditure and outputs (Lerner 1999, Wallsten 2000). In Tianjin 
of China, the government requires that, in return for getting government R&D subsidies, 
firms should spend over twenty percent of their annual income on R&D projects, and 
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generate technical income that can account for more than seventy percent of their annual 
income, in addition to filing five patents per year (The Ministry of Science and 
Technology of China 2008). For review purpose, firms need to retain programmatic 
progress reports as well as financial reports, to ensure that they are meeting government 
goals. Hence, government subsidies associated with differently specified goals demands 
distinct capabilities of entrepreneurial firms and imposes various constraints on firm 
strategy (Malik and Kotabe 2009). In terms of goal specificity, government subsidies can 
be categorized into two types: directive subsidy and associative subsidy. 
 
5.2.2 Directive Subsidy 
Directive subsidy refers to government subsidy that focuses on particular aspects of firm 
deliveries. Government in emerging economies applies a range of directive subsidy 
including R&D subsidy, patent subsidy, technology transfer subsidy, and etc. (Czarnitzki 
et al. 2011, Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001, Malik and Kotabe 2009). By lending directive 
subsidy to an entrepreneurial firm, government makes a positive judgment of the firm’s 
potential in terms of its capability in the specific field. For example, by subsidizing a 
firm’s R&D program, government endorses its strong capability in introducing front-tier 
technologies. As another example, subsidy on a firm’s new product represents 
government’s beliefs in its superior capability in technology commercialization. The 
more directive subsidy a firm has, the stronger will be the signal that government 
endorses the firm’s capabilities in that specific field. 
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Despite positive signals of directive subsidy, it also releases negative signals due to the 
difference between government and firms. As explained in Chapter 4, directive subsidy, 
with its restricted goals on firm outcomes, might largely limit entrepreneurial firms’ 
ability to respond quickly to technological and market opportunities, thereby signaling 
low payoffs of these entrepreneurial firms.  
 
Given both positive and negative signaling effects of directive subsidy, we expect it to 
exhibit a curvilinear effect on firms’ IPO success. When directive subsidy is low, an 
increase of it mainly signals that a firm gets more positive evaluation of its potential by 
government, thereby exerting a positive effect on firm IPO success. The negative signals 
about the limited capability of the firm to respond to opportunities, however, are not 
salient yet since a relatively small amount of government subsidy would not put 
substantial constraints on firm strategy. When directive subsidy keeps growing and 
exceeds moderate levels, its constraints on the firm cannot be neglected anymore. Given 
the considerable amount of directive subsidy, the regulation and supervision from 
government would be increased greatly as well. For example, The National Development 
and Reform Commission of China has a regulatory requirement that, after funded by the 
National High-Tech Industry Development Projects, all firms report to the government 
twice every year (in February and August) regarding their project progress, technical and 
managerial issues, and concrete measures to solve the issues. Especially, for projects 
exceeding 5 million RMB dollars, firms should strictly adhere to  the relevant regulations 
that approved by the National Development and Reform Commission (The Ministry of 
Science and Technology of China 2006). The strict government regulations can limit 
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entrepreneurial firms’ ability to flexibly change their strategies and adapt to new 
technological or market development. Hence, the more a firm receives directive subsidy, 
the greater the constraints it would experience from the goals set by government. The 
costs arising from the constraints could cancel out the benefits of directive subsidy. 
Finally, as directive subsidy goes from moderate to high levels, the negative signals 
might outweigh the positive ones, and result in a negative effect on firm IPO success. 
This line of argument implies that directive subsidy has an inverted U-shape effect on 
firms’ IPO success. 
 
5.2.3 Associative Subsidy 
Associative subsidy refers to government subsidy that sets general goals for firm 
outcomes. Its requirement on firm deliveries is not limited to certain aspects, but the 
overall firm growth. Examples of associative subsidy include small firm development 
subsidy, employment increase subsidy, and market competition subsidy (Lee and 
Osteryoung 2001, Lux et al. 2011). As this type of subsidy does not require specific 
capabilities of firms, each entrepreneurial firm is eligible candidate. Given the rampant 
corruption in emerging economies, whether an entrepreneurial firm can get associative 
subsidy depends on whether its managers have good relational capital with government 
officials (Gohmann 2010, Jong et al. 2010). Hence, outside investors normally regard 
associative subsidy as a strong signal of a firm’s relational capital with government 
officials. In other words, associative subsidy symbolizes firm managers’ relationships 
with government officials, rather than firm potential. The more a firm has associative 
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subsidy, the stronger will be the signal that government officials give preferential 
treatment to the firm as a result of relational capital.  
 
Moreover, unlike directive subsidy, associative subsidy does not place many restrictions 
on the goals and strategies of entrepreneurial firms. As the goals set by government are 
general, associative subsidy represents a lower coerciveness of regulation (Salamon 
2002), and allows a greater autonomy for entrepreneurial firms to utilize the resources 
more flexibly. Hence, associative subsidy carries few negative signals about firm 
profitability. Given salient positive signals but slight negative signals, associative subsidy 
simply has a monotonic positive effect on firms’ IPO success. 
 
5.2.4 The Effects Contingent on Types of Institutional Ties 
It should be noted that government subsidy is one of external resources that are 
vulnerable to the influence of institutional interdependence between firms and 
government. Drawing on the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), we 
posit that, the effectiveness of signals embedded in government subsidy would further 
depend on the interdependence nature between firms and government. Institutional ties, 
referring to the formal connections between firms and government (Bell 2005), provide 
insights of such interdependence and thus are expected to moderate the effects of 
government subsidy on firm IPO success. 
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According to the social capital theory, there are two basic kinds of ties: bonding tie and 
bridging tie (Pretty 2003, Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Bonding tie describes the links 
between actors within a community of interest (e.g., a firm and its equity holder) 
(Mahmood et al. 2011), and mainly provides social support (Woolcock and Narayan 
2000). Similarly, institutional bonding tie between a firm and government refers to the 
organizational links that bond the interests of the firm and those of government together. 
For example, when government or its affiliates have acquired a firms’ ownership stakes, 
it represents institutional bonding tie. Institutional bonding tie between government and 
firms is a hallmark of emerging economies where government often has institutionalized 
participation in the commercial industries (Peng and Luo 2000). Government in emerging 
economies often utilizes these firms to exert its industrial regulation (Okhmatovskiy 
2010). As a result, institutional bonding tie reflects the importance of these firms to 
government, thereby indicating a relatively larger power of these firms. Correspondingly, 
with such tie, government usually generates a support and safety net for the firms. Firms 
with such tie with government have many privileges and have relatively easier access to 
government owned resources (Peng and Luo 2000). 
 
Bridging tie describes the links between actors from different communities (e.g., buyer-
supplier) (Mahmood et al. 2011), and is manifested in brokers who have multiple 
memberships in different communities (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). It mainly provides 
access to opportunities, information, and resources (McEvily and Zaheer 1999). 
Similarly, institutional bridging tie between a firm and government refers to overlapping 
members between the firm and government. For example, when some of a firm’s upper 
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echelons are former or incumbent government officials, it establishes institutional 
bridging tie. Institutional bridging tie between government and firm is a typical relational 
approach of corporate political actions in emerging economies (Hillman et al. 1999). It 
reflects the importance of government to firms to obtain scarce and valued resources in 
uncertain environments, thereby indicating a relative larger power of government to these 
firms. The major benefit of such tie to firms is to facilitate the flow of heterogeneous 
information and resources between government and firms. 
 
Moderated by Institutional Bonding Tie 
Drawing on the resource dependence theory, we posit that institutional bonding tie 
dampens the inverted-U shape effect of directive subsidy but amplifies the positive effect 
of associative subsidy. 
 
As explained earlier, directive subsidy signals entrepreneurial firms’ potential in specific 
fields as well as constraints government put on firms’ goals and strategies. With 
institutional bonding tie, government’s interests are closely associated with those of 
entrepreneurial firms; together government and these firms form an interest community. 
With common interests, government tends to actively give preferential treatment to these 
firms (Mahmood and Mitchell 2004, Okhmatovskiy 2010). Correspondingly, 
government’s evaluation of these firms’ value could be largely biased. Hence, with 
institutional bonding tie, the credibility of positive signals on firm potential in specific 
fields will be questioned, resulting in a dampening mode of positive signaling effect. 
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Moreover, the interest community also motivates government to reduce the incongruence 
of objectives between firms and itself, thereby releasing the constraints of directive 
subsidy on entrepreneurial firms. It in turn dampens the negative signaling effect of 
directive subsidy. Taken together, by weakening both positive and negative signaling 
effects, institutional bonding tie dampens the inverted U-shape effect of directive subsidy 
on IPO success. Therefore, we propose that: 
 
H1: Institutional bonding tie moderates the inverted U-shape (⋂) relationship between 
directive subsidy and IPO success in such a fashion that: The slope of the inverted U-
shape will be increased for an entrepreneurial firm without institutional bonding tie to 
government than with such tie. 
 
Associative subsidy mainly revolves around interpersonal relationship between firm 
managers and government officials. Its positive signaling effect would be complemented 
by institutional bonding tie which presents a long-lasting and stable organizational 
relationship between a firm and government. Resources and information from 
government are typically not controlled by only one or a handful of well acquainted 
powerful government officials (Armanios et al. 2012). Instead, such resources are 
controlled through a group of government officials, some of which may not know one 
another (Armanios et al. 2012). Having good relationship with a few government officials 
may not be enough to secure sufficient resources. Additionally, the turnover of 
government officials exacerbates the risk of losing advantage of current relational capital. 
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Institutional bonding tie, by showing government’s dependence on entrepreneurial firms, 
helps these firms overcome the limitations of relational capital with government officials. 
First, institutional bonding tie broadens and diversifies a firm’s connections with 
government officials, which helps secure resources necessary for firm growth. Second, 
institutional bonding tie prevents a firm from losing contact with government officials 
due to personnel turnover in government agencies. As a result, with institutional bonding 
tie, the positive signaling effect of associative subsidy will be amplified. Therefore, we 
propose that: 
 
H2: The positive (/) effect of associative subsidy on IPO success is stronger for an 
entrepreneurial firm with institutional bonding tie to government than without such tie. 
 
Moderated by Institutional Bridging Tie 
In opposition to institutional bonding tie, institutional bridging tie is expected to amplify 
the inverted-U shape effect of directive subsidy but dampen the positive effect of 
associative subsidy.  
 
First, institutional bridging tie enhances the effectiveness of positive signals carried by 
directive subsidy. As institutional bridging tie indicates, politicians in a firm’s upper 
echelons act as bridges that link the firm and government together. As brokers, they know 
how to translate tacit knowledge of firm potential to government, thus helping 
government make a better assessment. Correspondingly, with institutional bridging tie, 
   114 
the credibility of positive signals on firm potential will be increased. In the meantime, 
institutional bridging tie also exacerbates the constraints of directive subsidy on firms 
because these firms depend greatly on government (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). They 
have to sacrifice firm growth to obey to government’s requirement in order to secure 
essential resources (Sun et al. 2009), thereby sharpening the negative signaling effect of 
directive subsidy. Taken together, by intensifying both positive and negative signaling 
effect, institutional bridging tie amplifies the inverted U-shape effect of directive subsidy 
on IPO success. Therefore, we propose that: 
 
H3: Institutional bridging tie moderates the inverted U-shape (⋂) relationship between 
directive subsidy and IPO success in such a fashion that: The slope of the inverted U-
shape will be increased for an entrepreneurial firm with institutional bridging tie to 
government than without such tie. 
 
As for associative subsidy, institutional bridging tie dampens the effectiveness of its 
positive signaling effect on IPO success. Institutional bridging tie implies that the 
entrepreneurial firms depend largely on government. Firm managers put in great efforts 
to maintain interpersonal relationships with government officials, e.g., hiring former or 
incumbent politicians to be board members, to secure external resources important for 
firm survival and growth. While institutional bridging tie adds bonus to interpersonal 
relationships between firm managers and government officials, associative subsidy also 
highlights the existence of interpersonal relationship between firm managers and 
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government officials. The essential ways of associative subsidy and institutional bridging 
tie to obtain resources from government are the same. According to resource 
complementarity perspective, for two types of activities that provide the same resources, 
doing more of an activity to leverage the resource reduces the marginal benefit of another 
(Arora and Gambardella 1990, Hess and Rothaermel 2011). Similarly, institutional 
bridging tie reduces the marginal benefit of associative subsidy. Therefore, we propose 
that: 
 
H4: The positive (/) effect of associative subsidy on IPO success is stronger for an 
entrepreneurial firm without institutional bridging tie to government than with such tie. 
 
H1 to H4 are summarized in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Contingent Effects of Government Subsidy on IPO Success 
   Government Subsidy 










With H1. (⋂) H2. (Stronger /) 
Without H1. (Stronger ⋂) H2. (/) 
Bridging 
With H3. (Stronger ⋂) H4. (/) 
Without H3. (⋂) H4. (Stronger /) 
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5.3 METHODOLOGY 
5.3.1 Sample and Procedure 
To construct our sample, we utilized the WIND database (the most widely used database 
of Chinese public listed firms) and the Zero2IPO database (the largest database of China 
venture capital and private equity industry1). China was chosen because it exemplifies 
emerging economies and facilitates the investigation of government subsidy under 
institutional risks. We focus on the IT industry rather than other industries because IT 
industry has attracted more than half of government subsidies to entrepreneurial firms in 
China (The Ministry of Science and Technology of China 2009)2, as shown in Figure A.2 
in Appendix A. Prior research has also identified that investment in IT industry was 
largely influenced by government in emerging economies (Shih et al. 2007). Consistent 
with prior studies (Shane 2000), IT entrepreneurial firms are those young firms that 
discover, evaluate, and exploit opportunities of information technologies to create new 
goods and services. 
 
Based on WIND database, we generated a list of 106 public IT entrepreneurial firms that 
went IPO between 2009 and 20103. For these 106 firms, we collected their fine-grained 
longitudinal data from their IPO prospectuses. Besides depicting firm history and market 
plan, a typical IPO prospectus reports a 3-year window of information about a firm’s 
financial indices, managerial experiences, and technological capabilities before IPO. 
                                                 
1 http://www.zero2ipogroup.com/en/. 
2 Other industries were excluded in order to control industry variance. 
3 Year interval started from 2009 because China’s stock market did not approve of entrepreneurial firms 
going IPO until then. 
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Specially, in China, IPO prospectus also informs of how much government subsidies a 
firm has received in the past 3 years before IPO. As a result, IPO prospectus becomes a 
public secondary data source suitable for our study. To ensure that information from 
prospectuses created by distinct underwriters do not have errors or inconsistencies, we 
cross checked important information (e.g., government subsidy) using firms’ first annual 
report after IPO which follows a consistent format. No difference was found between 
prospectus and annual report, and thus the information in prospectus was used. 
 
In addition, to guard against sample selection bias, we composed another list of 987 IT 
entrepreneurial firms that received investment from venture capital or private equity 
(VC/PE) in China since 1999 to 2010, based on Zero2IPO database. As VC/PEs typically 
wish to help entrepreneur firms go public as soon as possible to realize VC/PEs’ profits 
(Chang 2004, Hsu 2006, Junkunc and Eckhardt 2009), these 987 firms were candidates 
for IPO. Since these two lists overlapped by 45 firms, our final sample contained 1048 IT 
entrepreneurial firms. 
 
5.3.2 Dependent Variables 
Consistent with prior research (Gulati and Higgins 2003), our dependent variable, IPO 
success, was calculated based on two IPO financial measures. First, NetPro, the value for 
a firm’s net proceeds, was obtained from the first page of the prospectus. It is the amount 
of money a firm receives as a result of the IPO, less the costs incurred during the IPO 
process (Finkle 1998, Gulati and Higgins 2003). Second, we calculated PreVal, the pre-
money market valuation of firms (Stuart et al. 1999). The measure is defined as: 
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)qp-q(p=V* iutu where pu is the IPO subscription price, qt is the total number of shares 
outstanding, and qi is the number of shares offered in the IPO. While a larger amount of 
NetPro indicates a greater market expectation of a firm’s potential, a larger amount of 
PreVal denotes a greater market valuation of a firm’s current value. These two measures 
supplement each other in reflecting the total market valuation of entrepreneurial firms 
that go IPO. Following Gulati and Higgins (2003), we formed a composite dependent 
measure by taking the mean of NetPro and PreVal to create one financial indicator of 
IPO success. As the distribution of IPO success violated the assumption of normal 
distribution of dependent variable required by OLS, natural log was taken : 
PreVal)/2)+ln((NetPro =success) ln(IPO . 
 
5.3.3 Independent Variables 
Government subsidy was computed using the disclosed information of government 
subsidies that a firm received in 3-year duration before its IPO. For each time a firm got 
government subsidy, we coded down the goal of subsidy and the amount of subsidy. If 
the goal of a subsidy is intended to improve a firm’s specific capabilities (e.g., research, 
discovery, or commercialization of new IT), it is coded as directive subsidy. In contrast, 
if a subsidy is aimed to enhance firm growth in general (e.g., small firm develop 
development), it belongs to general government subsidy. Under each type of government 
subsidy, the 3-year average amount of government subsidies before its IPO (in millions 
of RMB Yuan) was used to measure how much subsidy a firm got from government. In 
particular, the 3-year average amount of specific government subsidies a firm received 
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was used to measure directive subsidy, and the counterpart of general government 
subsidies was used to measure associative subsidy. 
 
Institutional bonding tie was assessed by a dummy variable IBO Tie. IBO Tie was set to 1 
if government or government-affiliated organizations have acquired a firm’s ownership 
stake before its IPO, and 0 otherwise (Stuart et al. 1999). 
 
Institutional bridging tie was measured by a dummy variable IBR Tie. IBR Tie was set to 
1 if incumbent or former government officials sit on the board of a firm before its IPO, 
and 0 otherwise (Lester et al. 2008). Board of directors were regarded as the focal upper 
echelons not only because board of directors are the actual controllers of firms in China 
(Wu et al. 2008), but also because hiring politicians as directors is one major political 
networking strategy suggested by prior studies (Hillman 2005). 
 
5.3.4 Control Variables 
We include a detailed set of additional control variables to account for potential 
heterogeneity at the firm level. First, a set of controls have been well established and 
validated by prior research: firm age, 3-year average sales, IPO year dummy, HiTechPark 
dummy (i.e., whether a firm is located in high-tech park), location dummy (i.e., whether a 
firm is located in Beijing/Yangtze-River-Delta/Pearl-River-Delta or not)4, 3-year average 
                                                 
4 According to China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2010, the top five provinces in the 
ranking of patent production in China were Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanghai, and Beijing, which 
five are known as the distinct of Beijing/Yangtze-River-Delta/Pearl-River-Delta. 
   120 
ROS (i.e., return on sales) (Gulati and Higgins 2003, Higgins and Gulati 2006, Stuart et 
al. 1999). To control for intertemporal differences in the receptivity of the equity markets 
to entrepreneurial firms, daily updated equity index of the stock market was also included 
(Stuart et al. 1999). Second, based on the signaling theory, we controlled visible 
information about firm potential in terms of technological and managerial capabilities. 
Technological capability was controlled by R&D team size, patent (i.e., number of 
patents before IPO), softcprt (i.e., number of software copyrights), unpubtech (i.e., 
number of unpublished technologies), and trademark (i.e., number of trademarks) (Stuart 
et al. 1999). Managerial capability was assessed by payTMT (i.e., the average pay of top 
management team) (Fiss 2006). 
 




  Table 5.2: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. Min Max 
1. IPO Success (ln) Natural log of the mean of net proceeds and pre-money market valuation. a  21.15 0.67 19.77 23.55 
2. Firm Age Age of firm at IPO. b 3.63 2.67 0.75 10.75 
3. Sales Average of 3-year’s sales before IPO (in millions of RMB Yuan). a 4030.38 7534.69 286.85 68162.16 
4. IPO Year Set to 1 if a firm went public in year 2010, and set to 0 if in year 2009. b 0.81 0.393 0 1 
5. HiTechPark  Set to 1 if a firm is located in high-tech park, 0 otherwise. a 0.83 0.38 0 1 
6. Location  Set to 1 if a firm is located in Beijing/Yangtze-River-Delta/Pearl-River-Delta, 0 otherwise. a 1.77 0.42 0 1 
7. ROS  Average of 3-year’s return on sales before IPO. a 0.20 0.11 0.03 0.56 
8. Equity Index Daily updated equity index consisting of entrepreneurial firms’ stocks in China. c 11829.90 1137.81 9801.76 13772.17 
9. R&DTeamSize  The number of R&D employees before IPO. a 184.4 208.8 8 1555 
10. Patent The number of patents before IPO. a 20.21 30.64 0 172 
11. SoftCprt  The number of software copyrights before IPO. a 20.22 31.00 0 138 
12. UnpubTech  The number of unpublished core technologies before IPO. a 11.89 27.59 0 249 
13. TradeMark  The number of trade marks before IPO. a 5.54 14.66 0 114 
14. PayTMT  Average pay of top management team members before IPO (in millions of RMB Yuan). a 2.56 1.69 0 11.20 
15. DirSubsidy Average of 3-year’s amount of directive government subsidies before IPO (in millions of RMB Yuan). a 1.80 3.43 0 30.40 
16. AssoSubsidy Average of 3-year’s amount of associative government subsidies before IPO (in millions of RMB Yuan). a 7.55 26.42 0 249.49 
17. IBO Tie Set to 1 if government or government-affiliated organizations acquired a firm’s ownership stake before its 
IPO, 0 otherwise. a 
0.29 0.46 0 1 
18. IBR Tie Set to 1 if incumbent or former government officials sit on the board of a firm before its IPO, and 0 
otherwise. a 
0.60 0.49 0 1 
a Source: Coded from IPO Prospectus.     b Source: WIND.     c Source: http://biz.finance.sina.com.cn    
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5.4: RESULTS 
Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics and Table 5.3 reports a correlation matrix. With 
the maximum VIF of 1.964 (less than 10), the VIF test did not reveal signs of 
multicollinearity among this study’s variables (Marquardt 1970, Mason and Perreault 
1991). To further reduce potential multicollinearity between variables and their calculated 
interaction term, we mean-centered DirSubsidy and AssoSubsidy (Aiken and West 1991). 
 
5.4.1 Heckman Selection Model 
Consistent with prior research on IPO success (Higgins and Gulati 2006), we used 
Heckman selection model (Heckman 1976, Heckman 1979) to guard against sample 
selection bias. Sample selection bias can arise when samples are not randomly selected. In 
our study, the dependent variable, IPO Success, can only be measured when a firm goes 
public, resulting in a non-random sample (Gulati and Higgins 2003). Heckman (1979) 
offers a two-step statistical approach that can correct for such non-randomly selected 
samples. The two-step approach includes a selection equation and a regression equation, 
while accounting for the correlation between the error terms of the two equations. 
 
In the first step of selection equation, we employed a probit regression to estimate the 
likelihood of being selected. The total sample of firms (N=1048), including both private 
and public firms was used. The dependent variable was set to 1 if a firm went public before 
2011, 0 otherwise. Independent variables were created by using the information available 
for both private and public firms. In particular, since VC/PE financing may predict IT 
firm’s IPO rate (Hsu 2006, Junkunc and Eckhardt 2009), we created two independent 
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variables of VC/PE financing based on the information available in the Zero2IPO database: 
the amount of money a firm received from VC/PE, and the rounds of investments a firm 
received from VC/PE before 2011 or its IPO year whichever was earlier.  
 
In the second step of the regression equation, the estimates of parameters from the 
selection equation were incorporated into an OLS regression based on the sample of public 
firms only (N=106). This two-step approach provides consistent, asymptotically efficient 
estimates that help us generalize our results to a larger population of IT entrepreneurial 
firms (Gulati and Higgins 2003). 
 
Table 5.4 presents our findings with respect to government subsidy, institutional bonding 
tie, and IPO success. Model 1 containing all the controls shows that firm age, sales, IPO 
year, HiTechPark, ROS, R&D team size, number of software copyrights, and average pay 
of top management team were all significantly related to IPO success. Model 2 explores 
the main effects of two types of government subsidies. As expected, directive subsidy had 
an inverted U-shape effect on IPO success (ß of DirSubsidy2=-0.023, p<0.01), while 
associative subsidy had a positive effect on IPO success (ß of AssoSubsidy=0.005, 
p<0.01).  
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Table 5.3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17  
1. IPO Success (ln) 1                  
2. Firm Age -0.11  1                 
3. Sales^ 0.47* 0.15  1                
4. IPO Year 0.32* 0.01  0.10  1               
5. HiTechPark  0.19  0.10  0.11  0.10  1              
6. Location  0.16  -0.16  0.19  0.03  -0.13  1             
7. ROS  0.12  -0.23* -0.44* -0.04  -0.05  -0.01  1            
8. Equity Index -0.24* -0.03 -0.18 -0.32* -0.03 -0.06 -0.00 1           
9. R&DTeamSize  0.30* 0.06  0.22* -0.12  0.07  0.00  -0.01  -0.06 1          
10. Patent 0.06  -0.01  0.00  0.06  0.07  0.00  -0.23* -0.01 0.03  1         
11. SoftCprt  0.03  0.10  0.15  -0.13  0.23* 0.02  0.05  0.05 0.45 0.01  1        
12. UnpubTech  -0.06  -0.01  -0.03  0.04  -0.14  -0.05  -0.03  0.11 -0.03  0.22* 0.12  1       
13. TradeMark  0.05  0.01  0.04  0.04  -0.02  0.09  -0.15  0.22* 0.01  0.44* 0.22* 0.42* 1      
14. PayTMT  0.44* 0.08  0.17  0.13  0.17  0.16  -0.02  -0.23* 0.21* 0.09  0.22* 0.08  0.08  1     
15. DirSubsidy 0.34* -0.02  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.09  0.03  -0.09 0.28* 0.14  0.18  0.00  0.09  0.53* 1    
16. AssoSubsidy 0.29* -0.04  0.00  0.09  0.05  -0.04  -0.04  -0.17 -0.06  0.00  -0.11  -0.05  -0.06  0.34* -0.04  1   
17. IBO Tie 0.03  0.16  0.21* -0.06  0.07  0.00  -0.22 0.02 0.15  0.25* 0.19* 0.02  0.08  0.21* 0.19* -0.09  1  
18. IBR Tie 0.07  0.14  0.05  0.05  -0.06  -0.07  -0.05  0.08 0.14  0.08  0.13  0.12  0.18  0.01  -0.03  0.12  0.14   
N = 106; * Significant at 5% (two tailed). 
Note: As the correlation between Sales and AssoSubsidy is 0.74 and significant, Sales was regressed on AssoSubsidy and the residual was saved as Sales^ and taken to compute 
the correlation matrix and the following data analysis.  
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Table 5.4: Heckman Selection Model Predicting IPO Success (I) 
Dependent Variable: IPO Success (ln)                   Moderator: Institutional Bonding Tie 
 Model  1 Model  2 Model  3  Model  4  Model  5   
Main Effects a          
DirSubsidy  0.088**    0.125**  0.092**  0.130**   
  (0.024)   (0.038)   (0.024)   (0.037)   
DirSubsidy2  -0.003**   -0.023**  -0.003**  -0.024**   
  (0.001)   (0.009)   (0.001)   (0.009)   
AssoSubsidy  0.005**    0.005**  0.004**  0.004**   
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
IBO Tie  -0.057   0.083   -0.014   0.129   
  (0.092)   (0.111)   (0.093)   (0.112)   
Interaction Effects a          
IBO Tie×DirSubsidy    -0.011    -0.015   
    (0.052)     (0.052)   
IBO Tie×DirSubsidy2     0.019*  H1√   0.020*  H1√
    (0.009)     (0.009)   
IBO Tie×AssoSubsidy      0.011* H2√ 0.011*  H2√
      (0.006)   (0.006)   
Control Variables a          
Firm Age  -0.033* -0.026*   -0.027*   -0.031*  -0.033*   
 (0.016) (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015)    
Sales^ 0.000**  0.000**   0.000**  0.000**  0.000**   
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    
IPOYear 0.370**  0.355**    0.364**  0.333**  0.341**   
 (0.115)  (0.104)   (0.102)   (0.104)   (0.101)    
HiTechPark 0.211* 0.196*   0.228*   0.204*   0.236*   
 (0.120)  (0.109)   (0.107)   (0.107)   (0.105)    
Location -0.018  -0.030   -0.007   -0.022   0.001   
 (0.103)  (0.095)   (0.093)   (0.093)   (0.091)    
ROS 2.357**  2.416**   2.281**  2.420**  2.288**   
 (0.424)  (0.388)   (0.385)   (0.382)   (0.379)    
Equity Index 0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    
R&DTeamSize 0.001**  0.001**   0.001**  0.001**  0.001**   
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 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    
Patent 0.001  0.00   0.000   -0.001   -0.001   
 (0.002)  (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001)    
SoftCprt -0.005**  -0.006**   -0.005**  -0.006**  -0.005**   
 (0.002)  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)    
UnpubTech -0.002  -0.001   -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   
 (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)    
TradeMark 0.005† 0.005† 0.004† 0.006* 0.005*   
 (0.003)  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)    
PayTMT 0.127**  0.098**    0.095**  0.096**  0.094**   
 (0.026)  (0.031)   (0.031)   (0.031)   (0.031)    
IBR Tie 0.079  0.010   0.029   0.010   0.028   
 (0.085)  (0.080)   (0.079)   (0.079)   (0.077)    
Constant 19.831** 19.718**   19.765**  19.834**  19.887**   
 (0.578)  (0.532)   (0.522)   (0.527)   (0.517)    
Selection Equation Variables b         
VC/PE Invest Amount 0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
VC/PE Invest Rounds -0.302**  -0.302**   -0.302**  -0.302**  -0.302**   
 (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)   (0.045)   (0.045)   
Constant -0.690**  -0.690**  -0.690**  -0.690**  -0.690**   
 (0.088) (0.088)  (0.088)   (0.088)   (0.088)   
          
Wald chi-square 172.72 232.24  251.89  243.21  264.38  
Change in log-likelihood c -- 20.64**  26.85**  24.02**  30.49**  
Rho 0.14 0.27  0.37  0.28  0.38  
Unstandardized regression coefficients reported, standard errors in parentheses;  
a N = 106;  b N=1048; c Relative to Model 1 
† p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01 (one tailed) 
 
Model 3 to Model 5 test H1 and H2 (i.e., the moderation effect of institutional bonding 
tie). H1 states that institutional bonding tie moderates the inverted U-shape relationship 
between directive subsidy and IPO success. To test this hypothesis, we introduced the 
relevant interaction (IBO Tie×DirSubsidy2) into the regression equation in Model 3. The 
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coefficient associated with this interaction term was significant (ß=0.019, p<0.05). To 
facilitate the interpretation of H1, Figure 5.1 illustrates the interaction between directive 
subsidy and institutional bonding tie on IPO success (Aiken and West, 1991). It shows 
that the relationship between directive subsidy and IPO success follows a stronger 
inverted U-shape pattern without institutional bonding tie than with such tie. These 
findings supported the specific relationships formulated in H1. 
 



























H2 posits a complementary moderation between institutional bonding tie and associative 
subsidy. The coefficient associated with this interaction term (IBO Tie×AssoSubsidy) in 
Model 4 was positive and significant (ß=0.011, p<0.05). The interaction pattern is 
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consistent with our prediction (Figure 5.2). Therefore, H2 was supported. Model 5 further 
showed that the significance of interaction terms in H1 or H2 did not change after the 
addition of both the interaction terms: IBO Tie×DirSubsidy2 (ß=0.020, p<0.05), and IBO 
Tie×AssoSubsidy (ß=0.011, p<0.05) 
 


























Table 5.5 presents our findings with respect to government subsidy, institutional bridging 
tie, and IPO success. In Model 6, among all the controls, firm age, sales, IPO year, 
HiTechPark, ROS, R&D team size, number of software copyrights, and average payment 
of top management team were all significantly related to IPO success. Again, Model 7 
showed a significant inverted U-shape effect of directive subsidy and a significant 
positive effect of associative subsidy.  
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Table 5.5: Heckman Selection Model Predicting IPO Success (II) 
Dependent Variable: IPO Success (ln)                   Moderator: Institutional Bridging Tie 
 Model  6 Model  7 Model  8  Model  9  Model  10   
Main Effects a          
DirSubsidy  0.088**   0.075*   0.100**  0.114**    
  (0.024)   (0.039)   (0.023)   (0.039)   
DirSubsidy2  -0.003**  -0.003*  -0.004**  -0.005**    
  (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.002)   
AssoSubsidy  0.005**   0.005**  0.058**  0.058**    
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.015)   (0.015)   
IBR Tie  0.010   -0.143†   -0.213*  -0.366**   
  (0.080)   (0.102)   (0.097)   (0.113)   
Interaction Effects a           
IBR Tie×DirSubsidy    0.088†     0.046   
    (0.055)     (0.053)   
IBR Tie×DirSubsidy2     -0.022** H3√   -0.020*  H3√
    (0.009)     (0.009)   
IBR Tie×AssoSubsidy      -0.053** H4√ -0.054** H4√
      (0.015)   (0.015)   
Control Variables a          
Firm Age  -0.029*  -0.026*  -0.030*  -0.031*  -0.035**   
 (0.016)  (0.015)   (0.014)   (0.014)   (0.014)   
Sales^ 0.000**   0.000**   0.000**  0.000**  0.000**    
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
IPOYear 0.384**   0.355**   0.368**  0.315**  0.324**   
 (0.114)  (0.104)   (0.102)   (0.099)   (0.097)   
HiTechPark 0.204*  0.196*   0.203*   0.202*  0.212*   
 (0.119)  (0.109)   (0.106)   (0.102)   (0.100)   
Location -0.033  -0.030   -0.034   -0.021  -0.020   
 (0.103)  (0.095)   (0.093)   (0.089)   (0.087)   
ROS 2.331**   2.416**   2.487**  2.614**  2.682**  
 (0.424)  (0.388)   (0.380)   (0.370)   (0.361)   
Equity Index 0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000†   0.000   
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
R&DTeamSize 0.001**   0.001**   0.001**  0.001**  0.001**    
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 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Patent 0.002  0.000   -0.001   0.000   0.000   
 (0.002)  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
SoftCprt -0.005**  -0.006**  -0.005**  -0.006**  -0.005**    
 (0.002)  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
UnpubTech -0.002  -0.001   -0.002†   -0.001   -0.002   
 (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
TradeMark 0.005†  0.005† 0.006* 0.004† 0.005*   
 (0.003)  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   
PayTMT 0.132**   0.098**   0.099**  0.110**  0.111**    
 (0.026)  (0.031)   (0.031)   (0.030)   (0.029)   
IBO Tie -0.104  -0.057   -0.039   -0.001   0.004   
 (0.099)  (0.092)   (0.091)   (0.088)   (0.086)   
Constant 19.760**  19.718**  19.748**  19.589**  19.645**    
 (0.581)  (0.532)   (0.520)   (0.502)   (0.490)   
Selection Equation Variables b         
VC/PE Invest Amount 0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   
VC/PE Invest Rounds -0.302**  -0.302**  -0.302**  -0.302**  -0.302**   
 (0.045)  (0.045)   (0.045)   (0.045)  (0.045)   
Constant -0.690**  -0.690**  -0.690**  -0.690**  -0.690**    
 (0.088)  (0.088)   (0.088)   (0.088)  (0.088)   
          
Wald chi-square 173.29 232.24  250.28  275.33  296.39  
Change in log-likelihood c -- 20.38**  26.10**  33.04**  38.90**  
Rho 0.22 0.27  0.37  0.20  0.29  
Unstandardized regression coefficients reported, standard errors in parentheses;  
a N = 106;  b N=1048; c Relative to Model 6 
† p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01 (one tailed) 
 
Model 8 to Model 10 test H3 and H4 (i.e., the moderation effect of institutional bridging 
tie). H3 states that institutional bridging tie moderates the inverted U-shape relationship 
between directive subsidy and IPO success. In Model 8, the coefficient associated with 
this interaction term (IBR Tie×DirSubsidy2) was significant (ß=-0.022, p<0.01). 
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Moreover, Figure 5.3 shows that the relationship between directive subsidy and IPO 
success follows a stronger inverted U-shape pattern with institutional bridging tie than 
without such tie. Hence, H3 was supported. 
 


























H4 posits a substitutive moderation between institutional bridging tie and associative 
subsidy. The coefficient associated with this interaction term (IBR Tie×AssoSubsidy) in 
Model 9 was negative and significant (ß=-0.053, p<0.01). The interaction pattern is 
consistent with our prediction (Figure 5.4). Therefore, H4 was supported. Model 10 
further showed that the significance of interaction terms in H3 or H4 did not change after 
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the addition of both the interaction terms: IBR Tie×DirSubsidy2 (ß=-0.020, p<0.05), and 
IBR Tie×AssoSubsidy (ß=-0.054, p<0.01). 
 





























5.4.2 Robustness Check Using Alternative Dependent Measures 
To check the robustness of our dependent measures, we first used PreVal (ln) as an 
alternative measure of IPO success. The results were shown in Model 11 and Model 13 of 
Table 5.6. All the coefficients of interaction terms remained significant, confirming the 
results of Table 5.4 and 5.5. Next, we replaced PreVal (ln) with NetPro (ln) as the 
dependent variable, with results shown in Model 12 and Model 14 of Table 5.6. All the 
coefficients of interaction terms between government subsidies and institutional ties were 
significant, except one. Associative subsidy and institutional bonding tie (IBO 
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Tie×AssoSubsidy) was non-significant in Model 12 (ß=0.016, p=0.107). These results 
were generally consistent with the overall findings. 
 
Table 5.6: Heckman Selection Model Predicting IPO Success (III) 
 Model  11 Model  12  Model  13 Model  14
Main Effects a    Main Effects b   
DirSubsidy 0.127**  0.131**   DirSubsidy 0.117**  0.109**  
 (0.037)  (0.040)    (0.039)  (0.041)  
DirSubsidy2 -0.024**  -0.022**   DirSubsidy2 -0.005**  -0.004**  
 (0.009)  (0.010)    (0.002)  (0.002)  
AssoSubsidy 0.005**  0.001   AssoSubsidy 0.059**  0.054**  
 (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.015)  (0.015)  
IBO Tie 0.082  0.149   IBR Tie -0.373**  -0.423**  
 (0.113)  (0.120)    (0.116)  (0.120)  
Interaction Effects a    Interaction Effects b   
IBO Tie×DirSubsidy 0.015  -0.076†   IBR Tie×DirSubsidy 0.054  0.030  
 (0.052)  (0.055)    (0.054)  (0.056)  
IBO Tie×DirSubsidy2  0.019*  0.020*   IBR Tie×DirSubsidy2 -0.020*  -0.021*  
 (0.009)  (0.010)    (0.009)  (0.009)  
IBO Tie×AssoSubsidy 0.013*  0.008   IBR Tie×AssoSubsidy -0.054**  -0.053**  
 (0.006)  (0.006)    (0.015)  (0.015)  
Control Variables a    Control Variables b   
Firm Age  -0.028*  -0.033*   Firm Age -0.032*  -0.032*  
 (0.015)  (0.016)    (0.014)  (0.014)  
Sales^ 0.000**  0.000**   Sales^ 0.000**  0.000**  
 (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  
IPOYear 0.323**  0.385** IPOYear 0.306**  0.369**  
 (0.101)  (0.108)    (0.099)  (0.102)  
HiTechPark 0.228*  0.194*   HiTechPark 0.201*  0.180*  
 (0.106)  (0.112)    (0.102)  (0.106)  
Location 0.063  -0.101   Location 0.039  -0.113  
 (0.092)  (0.097)    (0.089)  (0.092)  
ROS 2.196**  2.236**   ROS 2.637**  2.525**  
 (0.382)  (0.405)    (0.368) (0.382)  
Equity Index 0.000  0.000   Equity Index 0.000†  0.000†  
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 (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  
R&DTeamSize 0.001**  0.001**   R&DTeamSize 0.001**  0.001**  
 (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  
Patent -0.001  0.000   Patent 0.000  0.000  
 (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.001)  (0.001)  
SoftCprt -0.005  -0.005**   SoftCprt -0.005**  -0.005**  
 (0.001)  (0.002)    (0.001)  (0.001)  
UnpubTech -0.001  -0.002† UnpubTech -0.001  -0.002†  
 (0.001)  (0.002)    (0.001)  (0.001)  
TradeMark 0.004†  0.007*   TradeMark 0.004†  0.007*  
 (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003)  
PayTMT 0.088**  0.093**   PayTMT 0.109**  0.102**  
 (0.031)  (0.033)    (0.030)  (0.031)  
IBR Tie 0.030  -0.037   IBO Tie -0.039  0.026  
 (0.078)  (0.083)    (0.088)  (0.091)  
Constant 20.210**  19.093**   Constant 19.982**  18.841**  
 (0.521)  (0.553)    (0.500)  (0.518)  
Selection Equation Variables b  Selection Equation Variables b   
VC/PE Invest Amount 0.000  0.000   VC/PE Invest Amount 0.000  0.000   
 (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)   
VC/PE Invest Rounds -0.302**  -0.302**   VC/PE Invest Rounds -0.302**  -0.302**   
 (0.045)  (0.045)    (0.045)  (0.045)   
Constant -0.690**  -0.690**   Constant -0.690**  -0.690**   
 (0.088)  (0.088)    (0.088)  (0.088)   
        
Wald chi-square 279.88 162.65  Wald chi-square 302.79 192.54  
Rho 0.34 0.42  Rho 0.35 0.39  
#Unstandardized regression coefficients reported, standard errors in parentheses;     
a N = 106;  b N=1048;  
† p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01 (one tailed);   
Note:  
Model 11: Dependent variable is PreVal (ln), and moderator is institutional bonding tie.  
Model 12: Dependent variable is NetPro (ln), and moderator is institutional bonding tie.  
Model 13: Dependent variable is PreVal (ln), and moderator is institutional bridging tie.  
Model 14: Dependent variable is NetPro (ln), and moderator is institutional bridging tie. 
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5.4.3 Robustness Check Using Instrumental Variables 
Apart from effectively addressing sample selection bias with Heckman selection model, 
we further attempt to dispel any concerns regarding potential endogeneity. Some may 
wonder whether government subsidies could be endogenous – the expectation of a firm’s 
IPO success may affect the amount of government subsidies allocated to the firm (i.e., 
reverse causation), or some firms may be more apt to receive one type of government 
subsidies (i.e., unobserved self-selection or omitted variables). To address this issue, we 
employed 2SLS (two-stage least squares) regression using IV (instrumental variables) 
estimation. Suitable instruments would be exogenous factors that are correlated with 
government subsidies but uncorrelated with the error term of IPO success. 
 
Reverse Causation. To account for the possible concern that the amount of government 
subsidies might be affected by the expectation of a firm’s IPO success, we selected 
income tax rate (Tax) as the instrument variable, measured by the average income tax 
rate applied to a firm in the 3-year duration before its IPO. Income tax rate is correlated 
with government subsidies because they both indicate the extent that a firm gets financial 
benefits in return for obeying the institutional rules set by the government. Moreover, 
income tax rate is unlikely to correlate with the error term of IPO success because the 
income tax rate depends on stable, standard, and visible policies that apply to all firms, 
regardless of the chances of IPO success of a firm. The income tax rate for any firm must 
undergo a thorough process of auditing examination before being applied. Hence, income 
tax rate is a good instrument for addressing potential endogeneity issue due to reverse 
causation. 
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Omitted Variables. Furthermore, to account for the possible concern that the type of 
government subsidies might be affected by unobserved self-selection or omitted 
variables, we chose two instruments – the number of collaborated public universities 
(CoUnv) before IPO, and the number of collaborated public research institutions (CoIns) 
before IPO. These two instruments are correlated with the choice of government 
subsidies because directive subsidy usually comes with public research projects (either 
with public universities or public research institutions) while associative subsidy does 
not. Moreover, these two instruments are uncorrelated with the error term of IPO success 
because of two reasons. First, collaboration with public universities or research 
institutions involves risky R&D activities that would not increase outside investors’ 
expectation of a firm’s future financial returns. Second, the expectation of IPO success 
would neither lead a firm to participate in more collaboration with public universities or 
research institutions. In other words, unlike IPO success, collaboration with public 
universities or research institutions are less related to financial returns. Therefore, the 
number of collaborated public universities and that of public research institutions are two 
good instruments for controlling potential endogeneity issue due to omitted variables. In 
all, three instruments were employed: Tax, CoUnv, and CoIns.  
 
Results. A DWH (Durbin-Wu-Hausman) test was conducted to check the possible 
endogeneity of direct subsidy and associative subsidy. The results of DWH test suggest 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that these two variables are exogenous. In other 
words, endogeneity issue is not a concern in this study. To further rule out alternative 
explanations due to any endogeneity issue, we still performed 2SLS regression.  
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A Sargan test was first conducted to check the exogeneity of the three instruments. The 
results of Sargan test suggest that all the instruments are valid. Hence, 2SLS regression 
was conducted using the three instruments. Table 5.7 reports the estimates with each type 
of government subsidy instrumented by Tax, CoUnv, and CoIns. Model 15 and 16 
focused on the moderation effects of institutional bonding tie, with directive and 
associative subsidy being instrumented respectively. The coefficient of interaction 
between directive subsidy and institutional bonding tie (IBO Tie×DirSubsidy2) was 
significant in Model 15 (ß=0.058, p<0.05) and Model 16 (ß=0.017, p<0.05). Also, the 
coefficient of interaction between associative subsidy and institutional bonding tie (IBO 
Tie×AssoSubsidy) was significant in Model 15 (ß=0.014, p<0.01) and Model 16 
(ß=0.020, p<0.05). These two models confirmed the significant moderation effects of 
institutional bonding tie in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.7: 2SLS Regression Predicting IPO Success 
Dependent Variable: IPO Success (ln)                          Instruments: Tax, CoUnv, CoIns 
 Model  15  Model  16   Model  17   Model  18  
Main Effects a    Main Effects b    
DirSubsidy 0.366*  -0.021**   DirSubsidy 0.267*    -0.002  
 (0.160)  (0.008)    (0.157)   (0.003)  
DirSubsidy2 -0.062**   0.115**   DirSubsidy2 -0.010*    0.066  
 (0.026)  (0.042)    (0.006)   (0.060)  
AssoSubsidy 0.005**   -0.005   AssoSubsidy 0.075**   -0.011  
 (0.002)  (0.009)    (0.020)   (0.068)  
IBO Tie 0.467*  0.100   IBR Tie -0.454**   -0.047  
 (0.235)  (0.104)  (0.154)   (0.305) 
Interaction Effects a    Interaction Effects b    
IBO Tie×DirSubsidy -0.255†  -0.021   IBR Tie×DirSubsidy -0.106   0.087  
 (0.165)  (0.051)    (0.152)   (0.070)  
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IBO Tie×DirSubsidy2  0.058*  0.017*   IBR Tie×DirSubsidy2 -0.013†   -0.020**  
 (0.026)  (0.008)    (0.008)   (0.008) 
IBO Tie×AssoSubsidy 0.014**   0.020*   IBR Tie×AssoSubsidy -0.071**   0.016  
 (0.005)  (0.009)    (0.020)   (0.067)  
Control Variables a    Control Variables b    
Firm Age  -0.054*  -0.049*   Firm Age -0.037*   -0.032*   
 (0.024)  (0.022)    (0.016)   (0.017)  
Sales^ 0.000**   0.000** Sales^ 0.000**   0.000**
 (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)  
IPOYear 0.255*  0.278**   IPOYear 0.267**   0.341**  
 (0.118)  (0.117)    (0.100)   (0.108)  
HiTechPark 0.222*  0.210*   HiTechPark 0.203*   0.160*  
 (0.109)  (0.098)    (0.099)   (0.095)  
Location 0.018  -0.034   Location -0.007   -0.028  
 (0.116)  (0.122)    (0.090)   (0.102)  
ROS 2.358**   2.101**   ROS 2.708**   2.373**  
 (0.463)  (0.438)    (0.389)   (0.503)  
Equity Index 0.000  0.000   Equity Index 0.000†   0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)  
R&DTeamSize 0.001**   0.001**   R&DTeamSize 0.001**   0.001**  
 (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)  
Patent -0.003†  -0.001   Patent -0.001   0.000  
 (0.002)  (0.001)    (0.002)   (0.001)  
SoftCprt -0.006**   -0.006**   SoftCprt -0.006**   -0.005**  
 (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.001)   (0.001)  
UnpubTech -0.003*  -0.003*   UnpubTech -0.002*   -0.002*  
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.001)  
TradeMark 0.008**   0.006**   TradeMark 0.006**   0.006**  
 (0.003)  (0.002)    (0.002)   (0.002)  
PayTMT 0.105**   0.169**   PayTMT 0.109**   0.100**  
 (0.036)  (0.070)    (0.032)   (0.032)  
IBR Tie -0.023  0.107   IBO Tie -0.004   -0.031  
 (0.109)  (0.105)    (0.086)   (0.100)  
Constant 20.621**   20.342**   Constant 19.886**   20.038**  
 (0.687)  (0.568)    (0.541)   (0.583)  
Instrumented DirSubsidy AssoSubsidy   DirSubsidy  AssoSubsidy 
R2 0.60 0.63   0.70  0.68 
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Unstandardized regression coefficients reported, robust standard errors in parentheses; N = 106 
a Moderator: Institutional Bonding Tie; b Moderator: Institutional Bridging Tie 
† p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01 (one tailed) 
 
Model 17 and 18 examined the moderation effects of institutional bridging tie. The 
coefficient of interaction between directive subsidy and institutional bonding tie (IBO 
Tie×DirSubsidy2) was significant in Model 17 (ß=-0.071, p<0.01) and Model 18 (ß=-
0.013, p<0.10). The coefficient of interaction between associative subsidy and 
institutional bonding tie (IBO Tie×AssoSubsidy) was significant in Model 17 (ß=-0.020, 
p<0.01), but non-significant in Model 18 (ß=0.016, p=0.407).   
 
Taken together, the sign and significance of the moderation effects in Table 5.7 remained 
similar as in Table 5.4. Hence, the moderation effects of institutional ties on government 




5.5: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
5.5.1 Findings 
This study examined the signaling role of government subsidy on entrepreneurial firms’ 
IPO success. Like previous studies which suggest that having support from prominent 
actors signals the potential of entrepreneurial firms and affects their IPO success (Gulati 
and Higgins 2003, Stuart et al. 1999), the results of this study affirm that entrepreneurial 
firms in emerging economies can credibly signal their potential by having support from 
government – the most prominent actor in these countries. But this strategy is not 
universally beneficial, as our results show. Both government subsidy type and 
institutional ties determine the effectiveness of this strategy. 
 
In particular, we demonstrate that moderate amount of directive subsidy is best for IPO 
success; either too little or too much of it hurts IPO success instead. This result echoes 
with the emerging body of research on the dual role – positive and negative – of 
government resources (e.g., Siegel 2007, Sun et al. 2009). Extending this body of 
research, our study further articulates a curvilinear effect of how a firm’s directive 
subsidy contributes to both construction and destruction of firm potential in specific 
fields. Moreover, our study expands this body of research by revealing the contingent 
value of directive subsidy. We found that the inverted U-shape effect of directive subsidy 
is stronger for firms without institutional bonding tie than those with such tie, but 
becomes weaker for firms without institutional bridging tie than those with such tie.  
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On the contrary, an increase of associative subsidy always brings about greater IPO 
success. To some extent, this result resonates with previous literature that regards 
government subsidy as a generic concept that provides non-specific support for 
entrepreneurial firms (Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001, Yiu and Lau 2008). Nevertheless, 
our study pushes the envelope of this literature by showing the contingent value of 
associative subsidy. We found that while institutional bonding tie amplifies the positive 
effect of associative subsidy, institutional bridging tie dampens this positive effect.  
 
5.5.2 Limitation and Future Research 
Attempts to generalize the results of this study should be done with care. These results 
should be interpreted with due consideration to the limitations of this study. First, our 
research model was empirically tested in China. Due to China’s communist culture, its 
institutional frameworks, stock market, and industrial environment might differ 
substantially from other emerging countries. Caution must be exercised when attempting 
to generalize the results across countries. Future research can be conducted to examine 
whether our findings are applicable to other emerging economies with similar communist 
culture such as Russia, or those with a more distant culture such as India. 
 
Second, although our theory revolves around signaling effect on investor decision 
making, we are not able to directly reveal the process of investor decision making. We 
expect that future studies use qualitative research method to provide further insight into 
the merits of the theory developed here and, in particular, regarding the processes of 
investor decision making, which we were not able to directly measure. 
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Third, we are also hopeful that future research will further examine the proposed two 
kinds of signals conveyed by the two types of government subsidies (i.e., directive 
subsidy signals firm potential in specific fields that is embedded in directive subsidy, and 
associative subsidy signals firm’s relational capital with government). For example, 
additional work could be done to identify direct measures for these two kinds of signals, 
and to explore potential different mechanisms whereby these two kinds of signals exert 
their influences.  
 
Fourth, this study focused on two types of regulative PIRs: directive subsidy and 
associative subsidy. To fully examine the typology developed in Chapter 4, another two 
types of subsidies – supportive and Augmentative– should be examined by future 
research. Potential measures for these could be subsidies from SOEs/SOIs. 
 
5.5.3 Theoretical Contributions 
This study makes several important contributions. First, by probing into the context of 
emerging economies, it extends the theoretical body of signaling effect, which has been 
limited to commercial support, to cover new situations where government support (in 
terms of subsidy) is particularly important. The influence of government on firms cannot 
be neglected in such a context because government dominantly determines resource 
allocation and is a major source of institutional uncertainty in these economies (Peng et 
al. 2008). This study further proves the necessity to examine government support since 
the signaling effect of government support is different from that of commercial support.  
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Second, when previous research mostly uses the signaling theory to suggest that status or 
reputation of prominent actors can be transferred to entrepreneurial firms (Podolny 1994), 
this study extends the signaling theory by suggesting that constraints put by prominent 
actors, if any, can also be transmitted to entrepreneurial firms and hurt firm performance 
at the same time. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that articulates such 
negative signaling effect, and demonstrates the need of attention to it. It is an important 
undertaking and enables signaling theory to accommodate negative and even 
nonmonotonic effects. 
 
Third, this study contributes to the nascent literature on political capital in emerging 
economies by revealing the paradox of government subsidy. Prior research mainly 
suggests that government subsidy carries positive value, at least no harm to 
entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001, Yiu and Lau 2008), while the 
results of the present study suggest that government subsidy can also be a significant 
liability to entrepreneurial firms. Although a few prior studies do touch the negative 
effects of PIRs (e.g., Siegel 2007, Sun et al. 2009), they focus on the process how 
political changes or reforms turn the positive value of PIRs into negative. Nevertheless, 
the present study shows that even without significant political changes, PIRs in emerging 
economies could still become liabilities. For example, a particular type of PIRs – 
directive subsidy, over some amount, generates unintended adverse consequences that 
run counter to the initial reasons for the pursuit of it. Hence, this study extends the focus 
of the past literature on who benefits from PIRs under political changes to include the 
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consequences of having “wrong PIR” from government. Specifically, by dichotomizing 
government subsidy into two types – directive and associative, this study opens the black 
box of government subsidy that has previously been regarded as a generic concept, and 
sharpens our understanding of the paradox of government subsidy. 
 
Finally, it enriches the growing research in entrepreneurship strategy in emerging 
economies by developing a contingency perspective of government subsidy in terms of 
two institutional ties. Most of the prior research has limited the moderator to institutional 
bonding tie (e.g., Li and Zhang 2007, Peng and Luo 2000). Drawing on the resource 
dependence theory, this study points out that another type of institutional tie – 
institutional bridging tie also reflects the interdependence between firms and government 
and thus modifies the effect of government subsidy. Moreover, this study compares the 
opposite moderation modes of these two ties. It is found that when institutional bonding 
tie dampens the effect of directive subsidy, institutional bridging tie amplifies it. On the 
contrary, when institutional bonding tie amplifies the effect of associative subsidy, 
institutional bridging tie dampens it. These interesting findings complete our 
understanding by providing a nuanced contingency perspective of how distinct 
institutional ties modify the effects of different government subsidy (Whetten 1989). The 
present study builds such a contingency perspective on theoretical underpinnings with 
special attention to the context of emerging economies (Tsui 2007), and neutralizes a 
contextualized theory of entrepreneurial strategy meaningful to emerging economies 
(Bruton et al. 2008, Meyer 2006). 
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5.5.4 Practical Contributions 
This study also has important practical implications. First, it provides valuable 
knowledge to entrepreneurial firms that are striving for survival and growth in emerging 
economies. Entrepreneurs in emerging economies have long believed the power of “the 
visible hand” – government, and they have expended significant efforts in gaining 
government subsidies. Our results suggest the extent to which entrepreneurial firms can 
benefit from government subsidy depends upon the type of government subsidy and 
firms’ institutional ties with government. Indeed, over-accumulated directive subsidy 
harms entrepreneurial firms’ ability to get further resources, especially for firms without 
institutional bonding tie or with institutional bridging tie. Hence, firms should proactively 
build a balanced portfolio of government subsidies suitable for their own cases, rather 
than being trapped by constraints stemming from government subsidy.  
 
Second, governments in emerging economies could also employ our findings to advance 
the institutional design and to increase the level of economic development of their nations 
(Mingo 2009). When choosing which firm to subsidize, government needs to pay 
increasing attention to avoid situations where subsidy harms firm performance. For 
example, for firms that government and its affiliates have taken ownership stakes, 
government should avoid to give too much directive subsidy as too much is as bad as too 
little. Instead, government could increase associative subsidy to facilitate these firms to 





In conclusion, this study examined the contingent effect of government subsidy on 
entrepreneurial firms’ IPO success entrepreneurship in the context of emerging 
economies. The results of this study serve as a platform on which the body of literature 
on signaling theory and resource dependence theory can be applied to emerging 
economies with future research along this direction. Given that regulative PIRs such as 
government subsidy are not easy to get and involve benefits and risks, scholars and 
practitioners should continue searching for effective ways where entrepreneurial firms 
can best harness regulative PIRs to achieve firm growth. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
 
6.1: SUMMARY 
This thesis explores the complex effects of PIRs (political institutional resources) on IT 
entrepreneurial firm performance in emerging economies. Scholarship increasingly 
notices that a lack of research exists in the complex interdependences between private 
firms and public resources (e.g., PIRs) (Mahoney et al. 2009, Tolbert et al. 2011). Our 
research fills this gap and advances theories of public-private interaction.  
 
In this thesis, we first articulate why political institutions could be regarded as resources 
for firms, while most studies maintain that political institutions are constraints to firms. 
Extending the institutional-based view, we identify two dimensions that are important to 
IT entrepreneurial firms in Study I: government involvement in goal setting, and 
government involvement in resource allocation. Based on these two dimensions, we 
generate a 2×2 matrix consisting of four types of PIRs: directive, associative, supportive, 
and augmentative PIRs. Furthermore, we add in a third dimension – sources of PIRs and 
categorize each type of PIRs into sub-types: transactional, regulative, supportive, and 
augmentative PIRs. In total, we have 16 sub-types of PIRs. Furthermore, we explore the 
different effects of these 16 sub-types of PIRs, and build up a theoretical framework of 
effects of PIRs. As a summary, Table 6.2 list out the four types of effects of PIRs. 
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Table 6.1: Summarized Propositions of Political Institutional Resources (PIRs) 
Effects on Entrepreneurial Firm Performance PIRs 
Inverted U-shaped 
Directive transactional PIRs 
Directive regulative PIRs 
Directive embeddedness PIRs 
Associative transactional PIRs 
Associative embeddedness PIRs 
U-shaped  
Supportive transactional PIRs 
Supportive regulative PIRs 
Positive 
Directive reputational PIRs 
Associative regulative PIRs 
Associative reputational PIRs 
Supportive embeddedness PIRs 
Augmentative transactional PIRs 
Augmentative regulative PIRs 
Augmentative embeddedness PIRs 
No effect 
Supportive reputational PIRs 
Augmentative reputational PIRs 
 
As the scope of theoretical framework developed in Study I is fairly large, it could not be 
done in one simple study. Instead, it deserves efforts to conduct a serious of studies to 
further develop and validate the framework.  
 
Hence, Study II chooses one sub-type of PIRs and drills down to provide more insights to 
understand the sub-type of PIRs. It focuses on regulative PIRs that are manifested in 
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government subsidy. Particularly, two distinct types of government subsidy are of interest 
(i.e., directive subsidy vs. associative subsidy). The findings, as listed in Table 6.2, not 
only reveal the different effects of these two types of government subsidies, but also 
show their contingent effects in terms of two kinds of institutional ties (i.e., institutional 
bonding tie and institutional bridging tie). 
 
Table 6.2: Summarized Effects of Government Subsidy on IPO Success 
   Government Subsidy 










With  Inverted U-shaped Strongly Positive 
Without Strongly Inverted U-shaped Positive 
Bridging 
With  Strongly Inverted U-shaped Positive 












6.2: FUTURE RESEARCH 
Three directions to extend the present research are worth considering. First, further 
research may empirically test other sets of propositions in Study I. One promising avenue 
is to compare the effects of distinct PIRs that differ in terms of government involvement 
in resource allocation; e.g., directive transactional PIRs vs. supportive transactional PIRs. 
As scholars have suggested, firms with direct connections to government will experience 
significant costs associated with government officials’ involvement in the corporate 
governance process (Okhmatovskiy 2010). Similarly, we could test how directive or 
associative embeddedness PIRs affect firm performance given both advantages and 
constraints associated with these PIRs. 
 
Second, future research can expand upon this thesis to scrutinize the contingent value of 
PIRs. As Study II shows, there is not one type of PIRs that is superior for firms to make 
profits. Instead, contextual factors (e.g., institutional ties) become important. Hence, 
future research should continue to examine the interactions between PIRs and contextual 
factors, especially paying attention to appropriate contextual factors for the PIRs of 
interest. For example, scholars could combine the institution-based view (as an external 
perspective) with the resource-based view (as an internal perspective) to understand how 
entrepreneurial firms leverage external resources from political institutions and internal 
resources within firms to sustain competitive advantage. PIRs, as external institutional 
resources, may interact with firm’s internal institutional and organizational resources 
(Oliver 1997). As R&D is a critical means of competitive advantage for IT 
entrepreneurial firms (Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001), R&D related institutional and 
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organizational resources become important internal resources. Prior research suggests 
several salient institutional and organizational resources in terms of R&D: R&D structure 
(Argyres and Silverman 2004, Bercovitz and Feldman 2007, Miller et al. 2007), R&D 
mode (Cuervo-Cazurra and Un 2010, Hess and Rothaermel 2011), and star scientists 
(Filatotchev et al. 2011, Tzabbar 2009). R&D structure and mode portray the institutional 
setting of R&D activities, while star scientists reflect the organizational and human 
resources of R&D activities. Hence, scholars could examine the interactions between 
PIRs and these three R&D related resources. 
 
Third, additional work could be done to investigate the effects of PIRs in other context 
rather than IPO context in Study II. For example, innovation has been recognized as a 
critical means of competitive advantage for IT entrepreneurial firms because it allows IT 
entrepreneurial firms to diversify, adapt, and even reinvent themselves to match evolving 
market and technical conditions (Gibson and Gibbs 2006, Lichtenthaler 2009). However, 
the effect of PIRs such as government subsidy on firm innovation performance remains 
unclear in the prior literature. It is worthwhile to examine which types of PIRs could 
stimulate more innovation output or enhance the innovation speed or productivity, using 






This thesis is an initial attempt to develop a theory of political institutional resources 
(PIRs) and entrepreneurship in the context of emerging economies. It is salient to the 
entrepreneurship literature for several reasons. Unlike past studies that focused on 
developed economies where commercial support matters more than government support, 
this study focuses on emerging economies where seeking PIRs from government is 
common practice for entrepreneurial firms. Unlike past studies that mainly examined the 
positive effect of PIRs, this study combines materials from the institutional-based view 
and builds a theoretical foundation that can account for complex effects of PIRs (linear 
and curvilinear). Extending past studies, this study provides a nuanced contingency 
perspective to examine new moderators that have become prevalent in the context of 
emerging economies (i.e., institutional bonding and bridging tie). The results of this study 
serve as a platform on which the theoretical body of political institutional resources can 
be applied to emerging economies with future research along this direction. Given that 
asking government for resources in emerging economies is not easy, similar to asking a 
tiger for its skin, scholars and practitioners should continue searching for effective ways 
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APPENDIX A. FIGURES OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 
 











Note: Government investment is shown in bars with bolded lines. 
 























Note: IT industry and related industries are shown in bars with bolded lines. 
 
Source: (The Ministry of Science and Technology of China 2009) 
 
